Scribble Works DMARC: is p=quarantine safe with a Resend key shared with Sanity Check?
The question
"Is moving Scribble Works' DMARC record from p=none to p=quarantine safe given the shared Resend sending key with Sanity Check, and what's the actual deliverability/reputation risk?"
Context: the email-domains SOP set a trigger (seven clean days of reports, then propose quarantine) that fired 2026-09-21 and has been carried unactioned through the 09-22, 09-29 and 10-06 lifecycle reviews. The shared key was the stated reason for hesitation.
Short answer: safe, with two cheap checks first. The shared key is not a DMARC risk at all. The real shared exposure sits at the Resend account level (complaint and bounce thresholds, key blast radius), and a DMARC policy change neither helps nor hurts it.
What we already know (from the vault)
- Scribble Works sends from two Resend-verified domains: root
scribbleworks.co(transactional, Fromhello@) andnews.scribbleworks.co(marketing, created 2026-09-14, not yet used). Both publishp=nonewith reports tohello@scribbleworks.co. The SOP's step 2 says to propose quarantine after seven clean days and not flip it silently. [[2026-09-14-scribble-works-email-sending-domains]] - Sanity Check sends as
sanity@raydata.co.raydata.cois a different registered domain, verified in Resend since 2026-03-16. [[2026-04-24-resend-setup]] - The two products share one 1Password key item; a shared Resend account is inferred from that, not confirmed by an API read. [[2026-09-29-lifecycle-email-sms]]
- The security audit already noted that a leaked Resend key can send as any domain verified in the account. [[B-security-abuse]]
- The quarantine proposal was raised 09-22 and carried on 09-29 and 10-06 without a decision. [[2026-09-22-lifecycle-email-sms]], [[2026-10-06-lifecycle-email-sms]]
Live records and reports (not vault; checked 2026-11-13, read-only)
DNS, by dig:
| Name | Record |
|---|---|
_dmarc.scribbleworks.co |
v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:hello@scribbleworks.co; fo=1 |
_dmarc.news.scribbleworks.co |
same policy, its own explicit record |
resend._domainkey.scribbleworks.co |
DKIM key present (also present for news.) |
send.scribbleworks.co |
MX feedback-smtp.us-east-1.amazonses.com, SPF include:amazonses.com (Resend return path; same pattern on send.news.) |
scribbleworks.co root |
SPF include:_spf.mx.cloudflare.net ~all, MX Cloudflare Email Routing, cf2024-1._domainkey present |
_dmarc.raydata.co |
v=DMARC1; p=none; pct=100; rua=mailto:…@dmarc.postmarkapp.com; sp=none; aspf=r; |
resend._domainkey.raydata.co, send.raydata.co |
Resend DKIM and return path present |
Aggregate reports: about 36 Google reports for scribbleworks.co sit in the founder's mailbox, dated 2026-09-14 through 2026-11-11. I opened 9 of them, spread across the whole period. Every record in all 9 showed the same thing:
- Source IPs were Amazon SES only (54.240.x.x), 1 to 2 messages per day.
- DKIM passed with
d=scribbleworks.co, selectorresend- aligned. - SPF passed on
send.scribbleworks.co- aligned under relaxed mode. - No other sending source appeared, and no failures.
Limits of that evidence: 27 reports were not opened; Google is the only reporter found (no Microsoft, Yahoo or Apple reports); there are no reports for news. because it has not sent; and daily volume is tiny, so an occasional sender could be missed.
Code read (worktree at a 2026-09-13 commit, so possibly stale): every outbound path - sign-in and invite mail, the daily playset Worker, the feedback reply script, the guides broadcast script - calls the Resend API with a @scribbleworks.co From address. I found no other service sending as the domain.
What the web says
- Resend's DMARC guide says a verified domain already passes SPF and DKIM, that DMARC needs only one of them aligned, and recommends none, then quarantine once all sources pass, then reject. It gives no durations and warns that
pctis "not widely followed by mailbox providers". (resend.com/docs/dashboard/domains/dmarc) - Resend uses the
sendsubdomain as the default return path, and describes it as serving SPF authentication, DMARC alignment and bounce handling. (resend.com/docs/dashboard/domains/custom-return-path, via search result) This matches the live records and the reports. - Resend API keys come in
full_accessandsending_access; asending_accesskey can be restricted to send from one specific domain. (resend.com/docs/api-reference/api-keys/create-api-key) - Resend's limits are stated per account: bounce rate under 4 percent and spam rate under 0.08 percent, with a "temporary pause in sending" if exceeded. The page does not say whether a pause is account-wide or per domain. (resend.com/docs/knowledge-base/account-quotas-and-limits)
- Resend sends from shared IPs unless a dedicated pool is bought (Scale plan and up). I found nothing in Resend's docs on how reputation is tracked inside the shared pool. (resend.com/docs/knowledge-base/how-do-dedicated-ips-work, via search result)
- Background knowledge, not re-fetched in this run: DMARC policy is looked up on the From header's domain, falling back to the organizational domain; a subdomain with its own
_dmarcrecord uses that record and ignores the parent'sp/sp. Google's sender guidelines require DMARC only for bulk senders (about 5,000 per day), andp=nonesatisfies them.
Convergences and contradictions
- Agree: the SOP's premise that mailbox providers score mostly by sending domain is consistent with how DMARC and DKIM work, and the live reports confirm both alignment paths pass for the root domain.
- Correction to the carried framing: the reviews treated the shared key as a reason to hesitate on quarantine. It is not. The key is how mail gets submitted to Resend; DMARC is judged by the receiving mailbox against the From domain's DNS.
raydata.coandscribbleworks.coare separate organizational domains with separate DMARC records, so a change to one cannot alter how the other's mail is treated. - Gap the vault overstated: the SOP says the subdomain split "bounds the blast radius". That holds for mailbox-provider reputation, but Resend's own thresholds are per account, so the split does not protect against a Resend-side pause.
Synthesis for RDCO
The quarantine flip is low risk and reversible in minutes. All known Scribble Works mail goes through Resend, signs with the root domain's DKIM key and uses an aligned return path, so it passes DMARC twice over. Quarantine only changes the fate of mail that fails both, which the sampled reports show is none. Sanity Check is untouched because it sends from raydata.co. news.scribbleworks.co is also untouched: it has its own p=none record, which is right until its first broadcasts have produced clean reports. Nonexistent subdomains would inherit quarantine, which is the desired anti-spoofing effect. There is no reputation "reset" from tightening policy, and no deliverability gain to expect at this volume either - the benefit is that nobody can spoof hello@scribbleworks.co to parents.
Two things could break, and both are checkable before the flip. First, the 27 unopened reports: I sampled a quarter of them and found nothing, but the SOP's own bar is "no legitimate-mail failures", and that needs the full set read. Second, any mail sent as @scribbleworks.co outside Resend. The likeliest case is the founder replying to a parent from Gmail using "send mail as hello@scribbleworks.co": the root SPF record authorizes only Cloudflare and there is no Google DKIM key on the domain, so that mail would fail DMARC and land in spam under quarantine. I found no evidence he has set that up (unverified - it is a Gmail setting, not visible from DNS or the vault). Cloudflare Email Routing itself is not a concern: it forwards inbound mail, whose DMARC is judged against the original sender's domain. Stripe or storefront notifications would only matter if a custom sending domain were configured there; no such source appears in the reports.
On staging: skip pct. Resend says receivers largely ignore it, and at 1 to 2 messages a day a percentage sample is meaningless anyway. The staging that matters here is already built in - root first, news. later, reject later still. The proposed record is the current one with only the policy changed: v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; rua=mailto:hello@scribbleworks.co; fo=1. The weak point in the rollout is monitoring: reports land in the founder's inbox where nobody reads them. raydata.co already sends its reports to Postmark's DMARC digest; doing the same for scribbleworks.co would turn raw XML into a weekly summary.
The actual shared-key risks are separate from DMARC and remain open either way. (1) A leaked key can send fully authenticated mail as scribbleworks.co, news. and raydata.co; quarantine does nothing against that, because the attacker's mail passes DMARC. Resend supports per-domain sending_access keys, which would cut that blast radius to one domain per surface. (2) Resend's bounce and spam thresholds are per account, so a Sanity Check broadcast that draws complaints could pause sending for the account, and Scribble Works sign-in links (which double as password recovery) ride that same account. Separate keys do not fix this; only a separate Resend account or team would. Whether the pause is really account-wide is not stated in Resend's docs. Neither item should block the DMARC decision.
Why this is in the vault
It closes the quarantine proposal that the Scribble Works lifecycle email review has carried since 2026-09-22, by showing the shared-key objection does not apply and naming the two checks that remain. It also corrects the blast-radius claim in the email-domains SOP ahead of the first news. broadcast.
Open follow-ups
- When Resend's bounce or spam threshold is crossed, is sending paused for the whole account or only the offending domain, and does putting Sanity Check and Scribble Works in separate Resend teams isolate it?
- Do Microsoft, Yahoo and Apple send aggregate reports for a domain at this volume, or is Google-only reporting a blind spot for a parent audience on Outlook and iCloud addresses?
- What does
p=rejectadd over quarantine for a sender this small (spoofing treatment at major mailboxes, logo display eligibility), and what evidence threshold should gate that step?
Related
- [[2026-09-14-scribble-works-email-sending-domains]]
- [[2026-04-24-resend-setup]]
- [[2026-09-22-lifecycle-email-sms]]
- [[2026-09-29-lifecycle-email-sms]]
- [[2026-10-06-lifecycle-email-sms]]
- [[B-security-abuse]]
- [[2026-09-02-retention-nudges-plan]]
Sources
Vault:
- 02-sops/2026-09-14-scribble-works-email-sending-domains.md
- 08-tooling/2026-04-24-resend-setup.md
- 01-projects/printables-product/reviews/2026-09-22-lifecycle-email-sms.md
- 01-projects/printables-product/reviews/2026-09-29-lifecycle-email-sms.md
- 01-projects/printables-product/reviews/2026-10-06-lifecycle-email-sms.md
- 01-projects/printables-product/audit-2026-09-02/B-security-abuse.md
- 01-projects/printables-product/2026-09-02-retention-nudges-plan.md
Primary evidence (2026-11-13):
diglookups forscribbleworks.co,news.scribbleworks.co,raydata.coand their_dmarc,resend._domainkeyandsend.names- 9 of about 36 Google DMARC aggregate reports for
scribbleworks.coin the founder's mailbox (report days 09-14, 09-23, 10-05, 10-16, 10-27, 11-02, 11-06, 11-07, 11-11) - Scribble Works repo worktree, commit dated 2026-09-13 (mail-sending call sites)
Web:
- https://resend.com/docs/dashboard/domains/dmarc
- https://resend.com/docs/api-reference/api-keys/create-api-key
- https://resend.com/docs/knowledge-base/account-quotas-and-limits
- https://resend.com/docs/dashboard/domains/custom-return-path (search-result summary, not fetched)
- https://resend.com/docs/knowledge-base/how-do-dedicated-ips-work (search-result summary, not fetched)