A Citing-References Check Was Finally Possible and It Leaves Simpson Standing but Narrower Than Recorded; the Equitable-Lien Split Does NOT Resolve in the Second District, Whose Only Post-Havoco Word Is the Unfavorable One - Plus Two New Second-District Limits the Vault Had Never Seen
The question
Verbatim: "Shepardize the Florida homestead future-advance chain: is Simpson v. Simpson (1960) still good law on 697.04 relation-back, and does the Havoco (2001) / Flinn v. Doty (2017) equitable-lien split resolve in the property's district?"
Merged from two follow-ups of [[2026-11-06-florida-future-advances-mortgage-characterization]], both blocked on the same missing instrument - a working citator. Scope was narrowed on 2026-11-07 to two residues: (a) the Simpson relation-back holding, and (b) whether any Second DCA decision holds that bare unjust enrichment without fraud or egregious conduct supports an equitable lien on homestead.
Nothing in this brief is legal advice. It is research for the founder's own decision and for handing to a Florida closing attorney. It is personal and family financial context: private vault only, no client, HQ or public channel. No figures appear here by design.
What we already know (from the vault)
- [[2026-11-06-florida-future-advances-mortgage-characterization]] established the load-bearing chain: Art. X, sec. 4(c) consent, not sec. 4(a) characterization, is the rail on which a joined, recorded mortgage binds homestead (Chames: the exemption "does not apply to mortgaged property"); and Simpson v. Simpson, 123 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 2d DCA 1960) is the single Florida case on the actual fact pattern, holding "the consideration would relate back to the time of the recording of the mortgage and become a valid lien against the homestead." That brief could reach no citator, so that cite was un-Shepardized, and it tagged Simpson's non-joinder outcome (P) as "superseded" by Pitts v. Pastore and Brown v. Towd Point.
- That brief also established (V) that Fla. Stat. sec. 697.04 is a lien-validity and priority statute addressed to third persons, never mentions homestead, and cannot do constitutional work (Havoco at 1028: "The legislature is powerless to affect the rights provided under the homestead exemption through statutory enactments.").
- [[2026-11-07-florida-homestead-improvement-repair-prong-textual-exception]] narrowed the split materially: read in the original, Flinn v. Doty, 214 So. 3d 683 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) reversed half its own judgment on a Havoco-consistent tracing ground, and Renda v. Price, No. 4D21-534 (Fla. 4th DCA July 27, 2022) quotes Havoco's narrow sentence as the governing rule while citing Flinn approvingly - so the Fourth District harmonizes the split itself. Not re-derived here; cited as settled by that brief.
- That brief also fixed the Fishbein cite at 619 So. 2d 267 and established (P) that Hillsborough County (Thirteenth Circuit) appeals to the Second DCA, which the January 2023 Sixth DCA did not disturb.
- Access history: static.case.law bulk JSON and CourtListener through Playwright worked on both prior nights; law.justia.com 403s WebFetch; no free citator was reachable on either night.
What the web says
On the citator gate itself - partly cleared, and the distinction matters.
- (V) A citing-references tool WAS reachable this time, through CourtListener via Playwright: its citation-lookup resolver, per-opinion "Cited By" pages, and full-text search all responded.
/c/So. 2d/123/289/resolves straight to the Simpson opinion. This is a real upgrade over the prior two nights. But it is not an editorial citator. It carries no Shepard's or KeyCite treatment signals - no "overruled," "questioned," "distinguished" classification - and it indexes only CourtListener's own opinion corpus: no treatises, ALR, law reviews, briefs, or trial-level and unpublished decisions outside that corpus. Everything below is a citing-references check, not a Shepardize. Westlaw and Lexis remain paid and unreached; law.justia.com was not retried. - (V) CourtListener's citation graph is demonstrably incomplete, so the graph alone would have given a wrong answer. Simpson's "Cited By" page lists exactly two opinions. A full-text search for the citation returns a third citing case the graph missed - Silver Waters Corp. v. Murphy, 177 So. 2d 897 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965) - whose own page in turn reports "Cited By (0)" while Snead visibly cites it. Full-text search is the more reliable instrument of the two and is what the findings below rest on.
On (a) - Simpson, read in the original and traced forward.
- (V) Across CourtListener's entire corpus, state and federal, Simpson has been cited by exactly three opinions, all between 1965 and 1976, and every one of them is positive. (1) Silver Waters Corp. v. Murphy, 177 So. 2d 897, 900-901 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965): "It has been settled in Florida that where advances under the mortgage are obligatory the lender is protected for the full amount of the advances even though actually made subsequent to intervening encumbrances. Simpson v. Simpson ...". (2) Indus. Supply Corp. v. Bricker, 306 So. 2d 133 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975), already recorded in the vault as favorable. (3) Snead Constr. Corp. v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 342 So. 2d 517, 519-20 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976), quoting Simpson at 293 for the proposition that advances on a note and mortgage for a stated sum certain are secured by the mortgage lien - and reaching that result "without aid from sec. 697.04." Zero negative treatment; zero citations in the last fifty years; no bankruptcy citations at all.
- (V) Simpson's relation-back holding has an independent second ground, and the Florida Supreme Court restated that ground as a holding under the current constitution. Simpson rests on two rails: sec. 697.04 relation-back, and the rule that homestead status does not defeat a pre-existing lien (Pasco v. Harley; First Nat'l Bank of Chipley v. Peel; Porter-Mallard Co. v. Dugger). In Bessemer v. Gersten, 381 So. 2d 1344, 1347 (Fla. 1980), the Supreme Court held, in the body of the opinion: "Since the acquisition of homestead status does not defeat prior liens, Porter-Mallard Co. v. Dugger ...; Pasco v. Harley ..., the lienor's right prevails over the respondents' homestead right." Footnote 1 states the rule generally: "In general, for a lien to be enforceable against homestead property, its existence must be established as of the time the homestead status was acquired." This is the Supreme Court, twelve years into the 1968 constitution, applying the identical two authorities Simpson used. It never cites Simpson, but it ratifies Simpson's premise.
- (V) The version of sec. 697.04 Simpson construed is superseded, but the operative relation-back clause carried forward verbatim. Simpson quotes a ten-year window and a subsection (2) that treated optional advances separately. The statute originated in 1941 (ch. 20846) and has been amended in 1953, 1961, 1963, 1970, 1983, 1992, 1996 and 1997 (ch. 97-102) - seven times since Simpson - yet "to the same extent as if such future advances were made on the date of the execution of such mortgage" survives unchanged into the current text, independently confirmed below.
- (V) The obligatory-versus-optional limit Simpson leaned on was legislatively erased, and the Second District said so, in the same district. Simpson's reasoning turns heavily on the advance being obligatory ("the mortgagee admits that she was bound to advance the money upon demand"). Silver Waters held the statute "precludes the drawing in Florida of any distinction between advances which are obligatory or optional," noted the 1963 amendment, and applied relation-back to optional advances. Current sec. 697.04(1)(a) reads "whether such advances are obligatory or to be made at the option of the lender, or otherwise" - quoted verbatim by the Second District in Razak v. Marina Club of Tampa Homeowners Ass'n, 968 So. 2d 616, 619 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007).
- (P) Simpson's non-joinder outcome is distinguishable rather than superseded, and Simpson drew the distinction itself. The 11-06 brief tagged it superseded. Read in full, the mortgagor was single when he executed and recorded - joinder was impossible - and the court expressly separated the two cells: "The distinction between a mortgage executed by both husband and wife upon an existing homestead and one where the homestead was declared subsequent to the execution of a mortgage is that in the instance of a pre-existing homestead the mortgage is an express encumbrance of the homestead interest ... while in the case of a mortgage made prior to the homestead declaration, the title as it then stands continues to be subject to the existing mortgage even though a homestead status subsequently attaches." Pitts and Brown v. Towd Point govern the first cell. Simpson occupies the second and never purported to excuse joinder where homestead already exists.
- (V) NEW, and the vault has never seen it: the Second District's most recent word on sec. 697.04 imposes two limits that bear directly on staged funding. Razak, 968 So. 2d at 619-20: "the statute creates the lien only for advances that are actually made," and "Because no future advances were made, any potential lien that might have encumbered the property pursuant to section 697.04 did not exist." A recorded future-advance mortgage is a potential lien until an advance is actually made. Separately, Razak held that Fla. Stat. sec. 95.281(1)(a) terminates a mortgage lien five years after the note's maturity date where that date is ascertainable from the record - a statute of repose that "prevents the accrual of a cause of action," independent of sec. 697.04's twenty-year advance window.
On (b) - the Second District and bare unjust enrichment on homestead.
- (V) There IS a Second DCA decision containing the sentence, and it is on homestead. Spridgeon v. Spridgeon, 779 So. 2d 501, 502 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) affirmed an equitable lien on a homestead where "[t]he court did not find that Ms. Spridgeon had engaged in fraud or misrepresentation," holding: "We need not determine whether the lien would survive examination under Zaleznik because the Florida Supreme Court later clarified that equitable circumstances other than fraud or misrepresentation, including the prevention of unjust enrichment, are proper grounds for imposing equitable liens on homesteads. See Palm Beach Savings & Loan Assoc. v. Fishbein, 619 So. 2d 267 (Fla. 1993)." The facts are an uncomfortably close analogue to the founder's: a family member advanced all the purchase funds for the owner's home plus later repairs and renovations, as loans to be repaid out of an institutional mortgage the owner then refused to apply for.
- (V) But Spridgeon is three ways weaker than that sentence looks. It is December 2000, six months before Havoco, and it rests entirely on the broad reading of Fishbein that Havoco narrowed in terms. It expressly declined to resolve the governing Second District test ("We need not determine whether the lien would survive examination under Zaleznik"). And it did not need unjust enrichment: "the trial court found the Spridgeons had agreed the property would stand as security for a loan from a third party."
- (V) The Second District's own test has two branches, neither of which is bare unjust enrichment, and the Second District has refused a lien on unjust enrichment alone. Zaleznik v. Gulf Coast Roofing Co., 576 So. 2d 776, 779 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991), quoting Jennings v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 177 So. 2d 66, 68 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965): an equitable lien on real property requires "circumstances such as fraud or misrepresentation of essential facts upon which the lender or contractor relied in good faith, or there must be an agreement by the owner of the property to have certain property stand as security for a specific obligation." Zaleznik found unjust enrichment established as a damages remedy and still reversed the lien: "Under the theory of unjust enrichment, we are effectively recognizing an implied contract ... It is, however, more difficult to imply contractual terms allowing the subcontractors a lien against the owner's home as an equitable remedy." (Zaleznik and Jennings are real-property cases; neither is framed on homestead.)
- (V) The only post-Havoco Second DCA decision on an equitable lien against homestead applies Havoco's narrow rule and reverses, and it reverses on commingling. Low Cost Auto Pawn, Inc. v. Greco, 851 So. 2d 768, 770 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003): "the trial court erred in imposing an equitable lien over Lang's homestead property because there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Lang used the illegal proceeds he obtained from Greco to invest in, improve, or purchase a homestead. See Havoco ... 790 So. 2d 1018, 1028 (Fla. 2001)." Tracing defeated it: "it is not clear that the proceeds obtained from Greco were the only source of money in the account."
- (P) Nothing since has moved the Second District either way. Jackson-Jester v. Aziz, 48 So. 3d 88, 90 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) re-quotes Spridgeon's broad sentence, never cites Havoco, is not framed as a homestead case, and reverses for unresolved unjust-enrichment elements. Searches of Florida DCA opinions for homestead plus "equitable lien" filed since 2011, and for Havoco plus "equitable lien" plus homestead across all dates, return no other Second District decision on point (the one 2D docket in range, Estate of Carter, No. 2D22-0219, is a contingency-fee dispute). (P) on exhaustiveness - four searches on one corpus.
Convergences and contradictions
- Convergence, and it is the answer to (a). Three independent lines point the same way: zero negative citing references in sixty-five years; three positive ones, two of them from Simpson's own district; and the Florida Supreme Court in Bessemer ratifying Simpson's pre-existing-lien premise under the 1968 constitution on the same two authorities. The relation-back holding stands. (V on each input; (P) on the aggregate inference, because absence of negative treatment in one incomplete corpus is not a clean bill of health.)
- Correction to the vault, in our favor on one axis. The 11-06 brief tagged Simpson's non-joinder outcome (P) superseded. It is better described as distinguishable on Simpson's own stated distinction, and the distinction is the mortgage-before-homestead / homestead-before-mortgage line. This matters only if the property is already the parents' homestead when the instrument records - a fact question, not a research question.
- Correction to the vault, against us on another. Simpson reads, standing alone, as authority for staged funding generally. Its reasoning is in fact soaked in obligatory advances. That limit is gone as a matter of statute (Silver Waters, 1963 amendment, current text), so the conclusion survives - but it survives on the statute as amended, not on Simpson's reasoning.
- Direct contradiction with the question as framed, for (b). The split does not resolve in the property's district. The Fourth District harmonized Havoco and Flinn itself (per [[2026-11-07-florida-homestead-improvement-repair-prong-textual-exception]]). The Second District has never cited Havoco and Spridgeon in the same opinion. It holds one pre-Havoco homestead affirmance on language Havoco repudiated, one 1991 refusal of a lien on unjust enrichment alone, and one post-Havoco reversal applying Havoco's narrow sentence. The binding district is the unharmonized one, and its only post-Havoco data point is unfavorable. (V)
- Convergence nobody has named, and it narrows the live split further. Low Cost Auto Pawn (2d DCA 2003) reversed on tracing and commingling; Flinn reversed half its judgment on a tracing ground; Renda adopts Havoco's sentence. So the tracing requirement is now confirmed in both the Second and Fourth Districts. Combined with the 11-07 finding that the split is not about reaching beyond the text, the genuinely contested residue is only what quality of wrongdoing is required - and the Second District has said nothing on that since 2003. (P)
- Convergence with the rail that works. The Second District's second Zaleznik branch - "an agreement by the owner of the property to have certain property stand as security for a specific obligation" - is a consent ground. It is the same instinct as Art. X, sec. 4(c), reached through equity. In the Second District the fallback with legs is the agreement branch, not unjust enrichment, and it was what Spridgeon's trial court actually found. (P)
Synthesis for RDCO
The citator gate is half-cleared, and the half that cleared changes the status of the vault's most load-bearing cite. Two prior nights reported no reachable citator. CourtListener's citation-lookup resolver, per-opinion "Cited By," and full-text search all worked through Playwright this time, which means the chain can be traced forward - but it is a citing-references check, not an editorial Shepardize, and the right posture is to say so plainly rather than upgrade the language. On that instrument, Simpson v. Simpson is not in doubt: three citing opinions in sixty-five years, all positive, two from its own district, none since 1976, none negative, and - the strongest input, because it is not a citation at all - the Florida Supreme Court in Bessemer v. Gersten (1980) holding under the current constitution that "the acquisition of homestead status does not defeat prior liens," on Porter-Mallard and Pasco v. Harley, the identical pair Simpson relied on. The 11-06 brief's single (V) conclusion survives the check. What does not survive is the loose reading of Simpson that treated it as general authority for staged funding, and the vault's (P) that its non-joinder outcome is superseded; both need the amendments made above.
The second half of the question resolves against the plan, and the honest answer is "no." The Fourth District has harmonized Havoco and Flinn; the Second District has not, and the Second District is where the property sits. Its authority is a pre-Havoco affirmance (Spridgeon) resting on reasoning Havoco narrowed in terms and expressly declining to resolve its own governing test; a 1991 refusal of a lien on unjust enrichment alone (Zaleznik); and a post-Havoco reversal applying Havoco's narrow sentence with strict tracing (Low Cost Auto Pawn). Anyone reading only Spridgeon would conclude the local rule is favorable. Read forward, the local rule is unsettled and trending narrow. The equitable-lien fallback should therefore be priced lower in the Second District than the 11-07 brief's "narrowed-then-stable" framing suggests - stable nationally, unharmonized locally, and with no local word in over twenty years. That reinforces the conclusion the three briefs have now converged on from three directions: the fallbacks are weak, and the sec. 4(c) consent rail is the only path worth engineering.
Two new Second District limits are the most execution-relevant output of the night, and neither appears anywhere in the vault. First, Razak holds that sec. 697.04 "creates the lien only for advances that are actually made" - the recorded instrument is a potential lien until funded. That is consistent with Simpson (where the advance was made) and does not weaken relation-back, but it kills any notion that recording alone parks a priority position for an unfunded family second; the instrument must actually be drawn against. Second, and sharper: Razak applied Fla. Stat. sec. 95.281(1)(a) to terminate a mortgage lien five years after the note's maturity date where that date was ascertainable from the record, calling it a statute of repose that prevents the cause of action from accruing at all - and it did so independent of sec. 697.04's twenty-year advance window. A staged-funding instrument drafted with a short, record-ascertainable maturity on the note could lose its lien while the build is still running. That is a drafting trap the vault's four-layer documentary checklist does not cover, it is binding in the Thirteenth Circuit, and it belongs at the top of the attorney conversation.
What this changes operationally. The 11-06 attorney question list stands with three edits: question (2) can be answered before the meeting - Simpson checks out on citing references, with the obligatory/optional and pre-existing-homestead caveats attached - which frees that slot; question (7) is now answered "no, the Second District has not resolved it, and its only post-Havoco decision applies the narrow rule," which converts it from a research question into a risk-pricing input; and a new question outranks both, on how the note's stated maturity interacts with sec. 95.281 across a multi-year draw period. The equitable-lien fallback, if it is ever argued in the Second District, should be built on the Zaleznik agreement branch - a written recital that the property stands as security for the specific obligation - not on unjust enrichment, which the Second District has refused once and never squarely granted on homestead.
Why this is in the vault
This closes open follow-up #1 and answers follow-up #2 of [[2026-11-06-florida-future-advances-mortgage-characterization]] - the Shepardize of Simpson and the district question on the Havoco/Flinn split - and closes the Second District residue left open by [[2026-11-07-florida-homestead-improvement-repair-prong-textual-exception]]. It changes the pre-execution checklist for the parents' acquisition closing tracked in [[01-projects/home-rebuild-2027/milestones]] by adding a sec. 95.281 repose check on the note's stated maturity and a Razak "advances actually made" condition, and it downgrades the equitable-lien fallback's local value from "narrowed-then-stable" to "unharmonized in the binding district."
Related
- [[2026-11-06-florida-future-advances-mortgage-characterization]]
- [[2026-11-07-florida-homestead-improvement-repair-prong-textual-exception]]
- [[2026-11-02-florida-purchase-money-mortgage-simultaneity-window]]
- [[2026-10-28-florida-homestead-purchase-money-family-mortgage]]
- [[2026-08-25-florida-intra-family-purchase-money-note]]
- [[2026-08-14-construction-to-permanent-loans-florida]]
- [[01-projects/home-rebuild-2027/milestones]]
Sources
Vault:
- [[2026-11-06-florida-future-advances-mortgage-characterization]] -
~/rdco-vault/06-reference/research/2026-11-06-florida-future-advances-mortgage-characterization.md - [[2026-11-07-florida-homestead-improvement-repair-prong-textual-exception]] -
~/rdco-vault/06-reference/research/2026-11-07-florida-homestead-improvement-repair-prong-textual-exception.md
Primary, read in the original this night via CourtListener (Playwright):
- Simpson v. Simpson, 123 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 2d DCA 1960), reh'g denied Oct. 7, 1960 - https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1612298/simpson-v-simpson/ (plus its Cited By page)
- Silver Waters Corp. v. Murphy, 177 So. 2d 897 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965) - https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/7493019/silver-waters-corp-v-murphy/
- Snead Constr. Corp. v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 342 So. 2d 517 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976) - https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1126056/snead-const-v-first-fed-s-l-assn/
- Bessemer v. Gersten, 381 So. 2d 1344 (Fla. 1980) - https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1928578/bessemer-v-gersten/
- Zaleznik v. Gulf Coast Roofing Co., 576 So. 2d 776 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991) - https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1653389/zaleznik-v-gulf-coast-roofing-co-inc/
- Spridgeon v. Spridgeon, 779 So. 2d 501 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) - https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1125273/spridgeon-v-spridgeon/ (plus its Cited By page)
- Low Cost Auto Pawn, Inc. v. Greco, 851 So. 2d 768 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) - https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/7818925/low-cost-auto-pawn-inc-v-greco/
- Razak v. Marina Club of Tampa Homeowners Ass'n, 968 So. 2d 616 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) - https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1883512/razak-v-marina-club-of-tampa-homeowners/
- Jackson-Jester v. Aziz, 48 So. 3d 88 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) - https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2535845/jackson-jester-v-aziz/
- Estate of Hollie A. Carter, No. 2D22-0219 (Fla. 2d DCA) - https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/11003067/the-estate-of-hollie-a-carter-by-and-through-lawson-carter-the-personal/ (checked and ruled out as off-point)
- Fla. Stat. sec. 697.04 - current text and History note (orig. 1941 ch. 20846; amended through ch. 97-102) - http://www.leg.state.fl.us/statutes/index.cfm?App_mode=Display_Statute&URL=0600-0699/0697/Sections/0697.04.html
Cited through the parent briefs, not re-read tonight: Havoco of America, Ltd. v. Hill, 790 So. 2d 1018 (Fla. 2001); Flinn v. Doty, 214 So. 3d 683 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017); Renda v. Price, No. 4D21-534 (Fla. 4th DCA July 27, 2022); Palm Beach Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Fishbein, 619 So. 2d 267 (Fla. 1993); Chames v. DeMayo, 972 So. 2d 850 (Fla. 2007); Indus. Supply Corp. v. Bricker, 306 So. 2d 133 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975); Pitts v. Pastore, 561 So. 2d 297 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990); Brown v. Towd Point (Fla. 4th DCA 2025).
Access limitations, stated plainly. Westlaw and Lexis are paid and were not reached. law.justia.com was not retried (known WebFetch 403). No editorial citator was reached, so no Shepardize in the proper sense was performed; every "still good law" statement here is an inference from a citing-references check on a single corpus that is known to be incomplete, and should be re-run on Westlaw or Lexis by the attorney before anyone relies on it. Research budget used: 1 WebFetch, 0 WebSearch, 0 QMD queries (vault reached by direct read and grep per dispatch), 2 vault briefs, ~14 Playwright navigations for primary-source reads.
Next actions requiring a credentialed human, NOT research questions. (1) Run Simpson v. Simpson, 123 So. 2d 289, and Spridgeon v. Spridgeon, 779 So. 2d 501, through Shepard's or KeyCite for genuine editorial treatment flags. (2) Pull Webber II v. Garcia (In re Valdes), Adv. No. 6:21-ap-00126 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.), Doc. 21 from PACER - written opinions are fee-free to a credentialed filer. Both are account-gated retrieval tasks, not research nights.
Open follow-ups
- Does Fla. Stat. sec. 95.281(1)(a)'s five-year repose period cut off a future-advance mortgage lien mid-draw, and how is the note's maturity drafted to avoid it? Razak applied the repose statute to kill a mortgage lien independent of sec. 697.04's twenty-year window, and treated it as preventing accrual rather than barring an action. Checked against every brief in
06-reference/research/: sec. 95.281 appears nowhere in the vault. This is the sharpest new exposure of the night and it is binding where the property sits. - What quality of wrongdoing does the Second District require for an equitable lien on homestead after Havoco, given that Spridgeon (2000) and Low Cost Auto Pawn (2003) have never been cited in the same opinion? The tracing requirement is now confirmed in both the Second and Fourth Districts, so this is the last genuinely contested piece of the split - and the Second District's silence since 2003 means it may have to be argued from Renda as persuasive authority.
- Is the Zaleznik / Jennings "agreement by the owner to have certain property stand as security" branch available on homestead in the Second District as an independent ground, without fraud and without unjust enrichment? Spridgeon's trial court found exactly this and the Second District declined to decide whether it sufficed under Zaleznik. If the branch holds, it is the drafting-reachable fallback, and it aligns with the sec. 4(c) consent rail the three briefs have converged on. Unaddressed in any vault brief.
- Does the Bricker (2d DCA) / Snead (1st DCA) face-of-instrument split still exist? Carried forward from the 11-06 brief, and Snead read in full tonight weakens the premise: Snead declined to read the 1963 amendment as requiring an express future-advances recital ("we decline to attribute to the 1963 Legislature any purpose to require that such mortgages 'express' more particularly than before their purpose to secure 'future advances'"). The two districts may agree. Worth one pass to confirm the split was ever real.