Both Taxes Follow the Money, Not the Face Amount — Florida Taxes a Future-Advance Mortgage on the Initial Debt at Recording and on Each Advance as It Is Made, and the Stated Maximum Required by Sec. 697.04 Is Expressly Carved Out of the Recording-Time Base
Nothing here is tax or legal advice. This is research for the founder's own decision; the final computation belongs to his CPA or closing agent.
Confidence tags: (V) verified at primary text I read directly · (P) secondary or practitioner source, corroboration only · (U) unresolved, gate reported.
The question
Verbatim: "What Florida documentary stamp and nonrecurring intangible tax treatment applies to a future-advance mortgage recorded at a stated maximum face amount but funded in stages?"
Context: live research for the Hillsborough County home-build financing decision. The practical question underneath it is whether choosing a staged-funding future-advance mortgage over a conventional mortgage changes what is owed at closing, and when. The backlog item's working worry was that if tax is assessed on the stated maximum at recording, the liquidity benefit of staged funding is partly offset at closing.
That worry is wrong on the primary text, and it is wrong for both taxes. Each statute contains an express future-advance provision that carves future advances out of the recording-time base. There is exactly one structure that produces the feared result, and it is a different instrument: a revolving line of credit.
What we already know (from the vault)
- [[2026-11-06-florida-future-advances-mortgage-characterization]] established the mechanics statute: Fla. Stat. sec. 697.04(1)(b) requires that the total unpaid balance secured at any time "shall not exceed a maximum principal amount which must be specified in such mortgage or other instrument," and Indus. Supply Corp. v. Bricker, 306 So. 2d 133, 138 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975) holds "the recitation of the face amount of the mortgage suffices." That brief also flagged this exact tax question as its open follow-up, and named three cases it could only see at snippet level.
- [[2026-08-25-florida-intra-family-purchase-money-note]] priced a conventional, fully-funded mortgage: doc stamp at 35 cents per $100 under sec. 201.08 and the nonrecurring intangible tax at 2 mills per dollar under sec. 199.133. It is correct on rates and correct on a fully-funded instrument. It says nothing about staged funding, which is why this brief exists.
- That brief also recorded that the statutory per-document ceiling in sec. 201.08(1)(a) binds only above a threshold well under the build size. That reasoning does not transfer to a recorded mortgage — see the note-versus-mortgage section below. The ceiling is a paragraph (1)(a) rule.
- [[2026-11-02-florida-purchase-money-mortgage-simultaneity-window]] and [[2026-10-28-florida-homestead-purchase-money-family-mortgage]] fixed the non-tax drafting requirements for the same instrument: both spouses joining, recording before the notice of commencement, direct-to-vendor disbursement.
- Gate-check re-run:
qmdacross the vault returns no brief covering documentary stamp or nonrecurring intangible tax on future advances. Not duplicative.
What the web says
Every rule below was read at the primary source. Statutes are the 2026 Florida Statutes at flsenate.gov; rules are the certified Florida Administrative Code text pulled from flrules.org; the TAAs are PDFs from the Department of Revenue's own Revenue Law Library.
1. Chapter 199 is alive, and the nonrecurring tax is the part that survived. (V) The 2026 chapter index shows Chapter 199 reduced to two parts: Part I "Nonrecurring tax" (ss. 199.133-199.183) and Part II administrative. The annual intangible tax sections are gone. Sec. 199.133's own history line records "s. 10, ch. 2006-312" — the same session law that repealed the annual tax amended, rather than repealed, the nonrecurring levy. So the nonrecurring intangible tax on obligations secured by Florida realty is current law, and the instruction not to assume a repealed or surviving chapter was warranted: half the chapter is gone and this half is not.
2. Documentary stamp tax: the statute itself carves out future advances. (V) Fla. Stat. sec. 201.08(1)(b) (2026): "If the mortgage, trust deed, security agreement, or other evidence of indebtedness subject to the tax levied by this section secures future advances, as provided in s. 697.04, the tax shall be paid at the time of recordation on the initial debt or obligation secured, excluding future advances; at the time and so often as any future advance is made, the tax shall be paid on all sums then advanced regardless of where such advance is made."
3. Nonrecurring intangible tax: a near-mirror provision, plus one trap. (V) Fla. Stat. sec. 199.143(1) (2026): "if the mortgage, deed of trust, or other lien is recorded or executed after December 31, 1985, and secures future advances, as provided in s. 697.04, the nonrecurring tax shall initially be paid on the initial obligation secured, excluding future advances. Each time a future advance is made, additional nonrecurring tax shall be paid on the amount of the advance."
The trap is subsection (3): "If the mortgage, deed of trust, or other lien secures a line of credit, the nonrecurring tax shall be paid as provided in s. 199.135 on the maximum amount of the line of credit, except as limited by s. 199.133, and no further nonrecurring tax shall be due on any borrowing under the line of credit." Sec. 199.135 makes that payable "when the instrument is presented for recordation." Subsection (3) was added by s. 1, ch. 97-123 and amended by s. 1, ch. 99-274, which matters for dating the older advisements below.
4. The current administrative rules say the same thing, and one of them is brand new. (V) Rule 12B-4.052, F.A.C., was amended effective 1/25/2026 — within the last year, so the pre-2026 versions quoted in older advisements are superseded.
- Rule 12B-4.052(8), "Open-end and Future Advance Mortgages": "Tax is due on the mortgage when filed or recorded in the state based upon the maximum indebtedness secured, exclusive of any amount that may be covered in a future advance clause. Regardless of whether the indebtedness secured by the mortgage is contingent, the mortgage is subject to tax based upon the maximum amount of the indebtedness secured. Each future advance made under a future advance clause is taxable when such future advance is made. The mortgage will not be enforceable in any court in this state, as to the future advance, until the tax due on each advance has been paid."
- Rule 12B-4.052(11), "Line of Credit Mortgages": "The tax required on a mortgage recorded to secure a revolving line of credit is calculated on the maximum amount of the secured line of credit, whether or not the obligation to repay is contingent upon the advancement of sums under the line of credit."
- Rule 12B-4.052(10)(b) classifies the build case by name: "A term loan with periodic disbursements, such as a construction loan, may be renewed for the undisbursed amount, together with the unpaid balance of the amount that was previously disbursed, without payment of additional tax." Paragraph (10)(c) treats "a revolving obligation" separately. DOR's own current rule text puts a construction draw loan on the term side of that line, not the revolving side.
- On the intangible side, Rule 12C-2.010(2)(a) (amended 1-17-13, carrying a "Reviewed 10-21-26" notation): obligations secured by a written specific lien on Florida real property "are valued at an amount equal to the principal amount of indebtedness at the time of execution." This tracks sec. 199.155, which values obligations "at the principal amount of indebtedness evidenced by such obligation."
- Rule 12C-2.011(1) (effective 12/29/2025) supplies the plumbing for later advances: nonrecurring tax "due on obligations or advances made under instruments which have been previously recorded" may be paid directly to the Department, and its examples include "tax payments due on an advance made under a future advance clause of a recorded mortgage on real property."
5. There is direct case authority for the pay-as-advanced result, and it is not one of the three cases the parent brief flagged. (V) Dep't of Revenue v. Citizens National Bank of Leesburg, 618 So. 2d 252 (Fla. 5th DCA Dec. 18, 1992), read in full. A bank made an advance under an instrument titled "Mortgage Modification and Future Advance Agreement," secured by the original mortgage, which brought the borrowers' total obligation to a figure roughly eight times the advance. The bank paid documentary stamp tax on the advance only. DOR audited, recharacterized the transaction as a renewal of the whole obligation, and assessed on the full outstanding balance. The bank won on summary judgment and the Fifth District affirmed: "We agree with the trial court that this transaction constitutes a future advance," because "although the transactions at issue enlarged the extent of the borrowers' indebtedness to the bank, the original loan obligations were not altered or replaced. Instead, new loan obligations were created. The purpose of the loan transactions was not to extend the time for payment of the original loans, but instead, to extend additional funds." The court cited sec. 201.08, Fla. Stat. (1987) for the proposition that "if a promissory note secures a future advance then documentary stamp tax is paid only on the amount of the advance."
This case does two things for us. It confirms the staged-funding result at the appellate level rather than only at the statute and the rule. And it identifies the audit risk that actually materialized in practice, which is not "tax on the stated maximum at recording" but DOR recharacterizing a per-draw instrument as a renewal and assessing on the full outstanding balance. That risk is now substantially reduced by text that postdates the case: sec. 201.08(5) (added 1997) defines "renewal" and expressly excludes modifications that "provide for additional, substitute, or further security for the indebtedness" or "consolidate indebtedness or collateral," and Rule 12B-4.052(10)(b) says a construction-type term loan with periodic disbursements "may be renewed for the undisbursed amount, together with the unpaid balance of the amount that was previously disbursed, without payment of additional tax."
6. The 697.04-via-201.08 case line, all three resolved to primary opinion text. (V) These were the snippet-level items the parent brief could not resolve. They turn out to be about enforceability when the tax is unpaid, not about the taxable base, which is why none of them disturbs items 2-4.
- Steinberg v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 178 So. 3d 473 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) is the one squarely on sec. 697.04 as a tax input, and it says sec. 697.04 is not one: "nothing in section 697.04 expands or contracts the concept of a taxable future advance set forth in section 201.08(1)(b)," and "Section 697.04 primarily concerns the securing of future advances under a mortgage; it is not a taxation statute." Deferred interest under a negative-amortization ARM was not a taxable future advance because it was not a "computable sum certain when the document[s were] executed." (Some databases mislabel this opinion 2016; the docket is 4D14-1200, filed 10/21/2015, 2015 WL 6161123.)
- Nikooie v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 183 So. 3d 424 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014) holds the sec. 201.08(1)(b) non-enforceability clause is self-executing: "This is a statutory limitation on enforceability applicable to a mortgage lender in a Florida court whether or not the parties raise it (here, they did not). No payment of tax, no enforcement." It reads "each advance" as broader than sec. 697.04's "future advance," reaching the original disbursement too, and allowed cure by belated payment on remand.
- Glenn Wright Homes (Delray) LLC v. Lowy, 18 So. 3d 693 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (en banc) is the other side: sec. 201.08(1) "contains no provision requiring stamps to be attached to a promissory note not recorded or filed in the public records before the note can be enforced." It receded from its own prior cases and certified conflict with the 1st, 3d and 5th DCAs. No Florida Supreme Court resolution was located (U — searched, not found; treat as not located rather than confirmed nonexistent). The split is narrow and runs the wrong way for comfort here: Glenn Wright only protects unsecured, unrecorded notes, and the 4th DCA itself still enforced the bar on secured debt in Schroeder v. MTGLQ Investors, L.P., No. 4D18-3177 (Fla. 4th DCA Sept. 18, 2019), reversing a foreclosure judgment for unpaid stamps and intangible tax on a modification principal increase that the borrower never raised below.
7. The revolving pole has its own case, and reading it in primary text corrected what we thought it stood for. (V) Barnett Bank of South Florida, N.A. v. State of Florida, Dep't of Revenue, 571 So. 2d 527 (Fla. 3d DCA Dec. 11, 1990), No. 90-1551, affirming consolidated DOR Declaratory Statement 90-004 DS (three banks: Barnett Bank of South Florida, Sun Bank/Miami, Southeast Bank). Three banks argued that revolving home-equity mortgages are not taxable at all, because the promise to pay is contingent on draws. They lost on both the taxability and the measure: "it is the mortgage document itself, as an evidence of indebtedness, that is being taxed — not the debt — and thus it is the recording of the mortgage document which triggers the imposition of the documentary stamp tax," and "we find that the promise to pay contained in the credit agreement is a part of the face of the recorded mortgages, that the mortgages are subject to the documentary stamp tax, and that the taxable amount is properly calculated based upon the maximum loan amount" (at 530).
The correction: across the full opinion and the declaratory statement, sec. 697.04 and the phrase "future advance" do not appear once. Barnett Bank never engaged the future-advance sentence of sec. 201.08(1), which was already on the books. So it is not authority for "revolving lines are measured differently from future advances." It is authority for two narrower things: that contingency does not exempt a mortgage from tax, and that the base is measured from the face of the recorded document. Leesburg in item 5 then reached the opposite measurement result two years later and cited Barnett Bank only in a footnote, for the generic face-of-the-instrument proposition, without needing to distinguish it. The revolving-versus-staged line was drawn by the Legislature, not by this case — expressly, in sec. 199.143(3) (1997, amended 1999), and administratively in Rule 12B-4.052(11). Barnett Bank's doctrinal fingerprint on that rule is its trailing contingency clause, not the dichotomy. Two reading cautions: the opinion quotes the then-current rate of 15 cents per $100, now 35 cents, so do not read its arithmetic as current; and the base came from the credit agreement only because the mortgage expressly incorporated it ("made a part hereof to the same extent as though set out in full herein"), applying Dep't of Revenue v. Lincoln Pointe Assocs., 544 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). That hinge is load-bearing and is taken up in the synthesis.
8. Department of Revenue advisements: consistent with the above, and mostly old. (V on the documents, (P) on their weight) A TAA binds the Department only as to the requesting taxpayer on the stated facts, per sec. 213.22, and each one carries DOR's own warning that later statutory, rule or judicial change may change the answer. They are not precedent. Note also that Rule 12B-4.052's subsections have been renumbered more than once, so a pre-2026 advisement citing "12B-4.052(11)" may be citing the future-advance rule, which is now subsection (8).
- TAA 92(M)-009 (Oct. 20, 1992), on a mortgage with a future-advance clause funded by draws: the taxpayer's stated plan, which DOR accepted, was that "Nonrecurring intangible tax will be paid each time a draw is made." The same advisement glosses Barnett Bank as holding that "where a mortgage recorded in Florida secured a revolving line of credit, the mortgage required tax at the time of recording based upon the full line of credit, not upon the individual advances to be made." That gloss is accurate as to the result but overstates what the court decided, per item 7.
- TAA 83(M)-008 (Oct. 27, 1983) priced a revolving development loan and a revolving construction loan on "the maximum permitted balance" at recording — consistent with the revolving pole, and predating sec. 199.143(3) by two years.
- TAA 88(B)4-011 (Sep. 7, 1988) applied the then-current rule to an equity line mortgage and concluded "Any future advances, if evidenced by a separate written promise to pay a stated sum would require tax, otherwise not." That condition is gone from the 1/25/2026 rule, which now taxes "each future advance made under a future advance clause" without reference to a separate note. The 1988 advisement is stale on that point.
- TAA 21B4-002 (Feb. 17, 2021), the newest on-point ruling, concerns an unrecorded revolving credit agreement and turns on there being no unconditional promise to pay a sum certain, with the express note that "Since no mortgages or security agreements are being recorded in Florida, no tax is due under s. 201.08(1)(b), F.S." Useful for the note-versus-mortgage distinction; not on point for a recorded mortgage.
- TAA 89(M)-006 carries a "Superseded" banner (by 89M-006R, Nov. 16, 1989). Do not cite it.
9. Non-payment has teeth, in rate terms. (V) Doc stamp: sec. 201.08(1)(b) — "Failure to pay the tax shall not affect the lien for any such future advance given by s. 697.04," but non-payment is a first-degree misdemeanor and "The mortgage, trust deed, or other instrument shall not be enforceable in any court of this state as to any such advance unless and until the tax due thereon upon each advance that may have been made thereunder has been paid." Intangible: sec. 199.282(4) — no such lien "shall be enforceable in any Florida court, nor shall any written evidence of such mortgage, deed of trust, or other lien be recorded in any public record of the state, until the nonrecurring tax imposed by this chapter, including any taxes due on future advances, has been paid," though failure "shall not affect the constructive notice given by recording." Sec. 199.282(2)-(3): interest runs at 12 percent per year on unpaid nonrecurring tax, plus a delinquency penalty of 10 percent of the delinquent tax per calendar month or portion, capped at 50 percent.
Convergences and contradictions
- Full convergence on the answer, across five independent source types. Statute (sec. 201.08(1)(b) and sec. 199.143(1)), current administrative rule (12B-4.052(8)), DOR practice (TAA 92(M)-009), appellate holding (Leesburg, taxing a future advance on the advance alone and rejecting DOR's attempt to assess the full balance), and Steinberg, which refuses to let sec. 697.04 enlarge the taxable base at all, land in the same place: a non-revolving future-advance mortgage is taxed at recording on its present indebtedness, then on each advance as made. No source anywhere in the chain taxes the sec. 697.04 stated maximum at recording for this instrument type. (V)
- The contradiction is inside the new rule's own middle sentence, and it is the single most litigable line in the chain. Rule 12B-4.052(8) says the recording base is "the maximum indebtedness secured, exclusive of any amount that may be covered in a future advance clause," and then says "Regardless of whether the indebtedness secured by the mortgage is contingent, the mortgage is subject to tax based upon the maximum amount of the indebtedness secured." Read in isolation that second sentence says maximum. Read with the exclusion in the first sentence and the per-advance rule in the third, "maximum indebtedness secured" has to mean the maximum present indebtedness, with future-advance capacity excluded — otherwise the rule contradicts the statute it implements, and sentences one and three become dead letters. The harmonizing reading is the only coherent one and it is the one the statute compels, but this language is nine months old and no court or advisement has construed it. (V on the text, (U) on whether anyone has construed it.)
- Note the rule's base is not "cash advanced at closing," and the difference matters. Both the statute's "initial debt or obligation secured" and the rule's "maximum indebtedness secured" are measured by the obligation, not by what was funded. Barnett Bank is squarely on that point: contingency does not exempt, and the tax is on the document rather than the debt. So the recording-time base is the maximum present indebtedness the instrument secures, committed-but-undrawn included, minus whatever the future-advance clause covers. Framing it as "tax on what moved" is a useful shorthand for the build case and a wrong statement of the rule. (V)
- The ch. 199 currency doubt was tested, and it resolves in favor of the tax being live. A fresh-eyes pass flagged that a statute remaining on the books is not proof it still bites, given ch. 2006-312. Four independent checks say it does bite: the 2026 chapter index still carries Part I "Nonrecurring tax"; sec. 199.133's history line lists ch. 2006-312 as an amendment rather than a repealer; Rule 12C-2.010 carries a "Reviewed 10-21-26" notation; and Rule 12C-2.011 was amended effective 12/29/2025 with future-advance payment examples, which is DOR actively administering the levy last winter. (V)
- The vault's cap reasoning does not transfer, and this is a real correction. [[2026-08-25-florida-intra-family-purchase-money-note]] reasoned about the sec. 201.08(1)(a) per-document ceiling. Rule 12B-4.052(10)(e) states flatly that that limitation "does not apply to a mortgage, security agreement, or other lien filed or recorded in Florida." Nor does the nonrecurring intangible tax have any ceiling. On a recorded mortgage both taxes are uncapped and purely proportional to the base. (V)
- The older advisements and the live statute disagree, and the statute wins. TAA 92(M)-009 paraphrases sec. 199.143(1) as covering "a line of credit or future advances" with tax "payable on each advance when made." That was defensible in 1992 and is wrong now: the line-of-credit carve-out in sec. 199.143(3) arrived in 1997 and was amended in 1999, and it does the opposite. Most of DOR's future-advance and line-of-credit advisement corpus is pre-1998 and rests on superseded text. (V)
Synthesis for RDCO
The feared cost does not exist, and the premise that generated this question should be retired. Both Florida recording taxes contain an express, parallel future-advance provision, and both carve future advances out of the recording-time base. At closing, documentary stamp tax at 35 cents per $100 or fraction attaches to the present indebtedness the instrument secures, and the nonrecurring intangible tax at 2 mills per dollar (20 cents per $100) attaches to the same base. The stated maximum principal amount that sec. 697.04(1)(b) forces onto the face of the instrument is not that base to the extent it represents future-advance capacity. It is the lien ceiling, and Steinberg says in terms that sec. 697.04 "is not a taxation statute." Every advance thereafter carries both taxes, at the same rates, on the amount of that advance, when it is made, and Leesburg is an appellate affirmance of exactly that computation against a contrary DOR assessment. So staged funding does not buy a tax holiday off the top of the deal and it does not cost one either: the tax follows the obligation as the obligation comes into being, and the liquidity benefit of staged funding survives intact on the tax side. If the stated maximum is never fully drawn, the aggregate tax on a staged instrument is strictly lower than on a fully-funded one, because undrawn future-advance capacity is never taxed. One precision worth keeping: the base is the obligation, not the cash. Barnett Bank holds that contingency does not exempt and that the tax falls on the document rather than the debt, so a committed present obligation that happens to be undrawn at closing is still in the recording-time base. Only amounts the future-advance clause covers come out.
The one way to lose this is to let the instrument be drafted as a revolving line of credit, and it is a drafting choice, not an economic one. Sec. 199.143(3) is unambiguous: a lien securing "a line of credit" pays the nonrecurring intangible tax on the maximum amount of the line at recording, with no further tax on borrowings. Rule 12B-4.052(11) does the same for documentary stamp on "a revolving line of credit," and Barnett Bank is the appellate authority behind it. That is the exact outcome the backlog item feared, waiting behind one word. A revolving facility and a non-revolving construction draw facility can look economically similar to a borrower, since both deliver money in stages against a ceiling, but they are taxed at opposite poles, and the hinge is whether the borrower can repay and re-borrow. The line was drawn by the Legislature, in 1997 and 1999, in sec. 199.143(3); no case drew it, and reading Barnett Bank in primary text was what established that, since it never engaged sec. 697.04 or the future-advance sentence at all. DOR's current rule draws the line the right way for a build: Rule 12B-4.052(10)(b) names "a term loan with periodic disbursements, such as a construction loan" and treats it separately from "a revolving obligation" in (10)(c). That is strong contextual support and it is in a currently-effective rule, but it sits in the renewals subsection rather than in a definition, and neither sec. 199.143 nor Chapter 199 nor Rule 12C-2.001 defines "line of credit" at all. The intangible-tax side of the revolving/non-revolving distinction rests on the bare statutory phrase plus analogy to the documentary-stamp rule, and that is a labeled soft spot, not a settled rule. (U) For the family-second instrument specifically, non-revolving is also the natural drafting choice, since nobody wants a re-borrowing right in a one-way intra-family advance.
The real exposure moved from cost to compliance, and it is recurring rather than one-time. On a conventional mortgage the recording taxes are a closing-day event and then they are over. On a staged future-advance mortgage they become a per-draw obligation for the life of the build, and both statutes attach enforceability consequences to missing one. Sec. 201.08(1)(b) preserves the sec. 697.04 lien but makes the instrument unenforceable "as to any such advance" until the tax on that advance is paid, and makes non-payment a first-degree misdemeanor. Sec. 199.282(4) goes further and bars enforcement of the lien in any Florida court until the nonrecurring tax "including any taxes due on future advances" is paid, with interest at 12 percent per year and a monthly delinquency penalty. Nikooie then removes the comfort of thinking nobody will notice: the bar is self-executing, the court applies it even when neither party pleads it, and Schroeder is a 4th DCA foreclosure judgment reversed on exactly that ground where the borrower had not raised it. The cure is cheap — belated payment worked in Nikooie — but the failure mode is that an unpriced, unassigned per-draw filing duty quietly accumulates across a multi-stage build and surfaces years later when the lien actually needs to be enforced. Rule 12C-2.011(1) permits paying the intangible tax on post-recording advances directly to the Department, and sec. 199.143(2) routes it to the clerk who took the initial tax; either way, somebody has to own the task per draw, and on a family second mortgage there is no institutional servicer to own it by default.
The one practical risk the primary text leaves live is a drafting trap, and Barnett Bank is the case that shows how it is sprung. Sec. 201.08(7) says taxability "shall be determined solely from the face of the document and any separate document expressly incorporated into the document," and Rule 12B-4.052(5)(b) turns that into an express-incorporation test with enumerated magic words, distinguishing "is incorporated herein" and "is made a part hereof" from mere "pursuant to," "is subject to" and "reference is made to." Barnett Bank is what that test looks like when it fails for the borrower: the banks' mortgages did not state the facility maximum on their own faces, but each mortgage said the credit agreement was "made a part hereof to the same extent as though set out in full herein," so the maximum inside the agreement became part of the face and became the base. Had the agreement not been expressly incorporated, Lincoln Pointe would have excluded it as extrinsic. Sec. 697.04(1)(b) meanwhile requires a maximum principal amount on the face, and Bricker says the mortgage's face amount suffices for it. So an instrument can satisfy sec. 697.04 by stating one large number while the correct recording-time base is far smaller, and the way that goes wrong is not a clerk misreading a number but a loan or construction agreement stating the full facility as a present promise to pay and then being expressly incorporated into the mortgage. (V on each component; (U) on how a Hillsborough clerk computes a correctly-drafted instrument in practice, which is a closing-agent question this research cannot answer.) The mitigation follows from the text: recite the initial advance as its own identified amount, recite the future-advance structure by reference rather than by express incorporation, keep any document stating the full facility maximum out of the incorporation clause, and expect to point the clerk at sec. 201.08(1)(b) and Rule 12B-4.052(8). A fifth item belongs on that list from Leesburg: each per-draw instrument should recite that it creates a new obligation and does not alter, extend or replace the original, which is the exact finding that defeated DOR's renewal theory.
Why this is in the vault
This closes open follow-up #5 of [[2026-11-06-florida-future-advances-mortgage-characterization]] and prices the instrument that brief recommended, which [[2026-08-25-florida-intra-family-purchase-money-note]] had only priced in its conventional fully-funded form. It changes the pre-execution checklist for the parents' acquisition closing in the home-rebuild project in two specific ways: a non-revolving future-advance recital moves from a drafting nicety to a tax-material term, because the revolving label flips both taxes onto the full stated maximum at recording; and a per-draw tax filing step has to be added to the draw-package checklist alongside the lien waivers and the Construction Loan Up-Date endorsement, because missing it is an enforceability defect under sec. 201.08(1)(b) and sec. 199.282(4) rather than just a late fee. It adds two specific recitals to the drafting list that brief produced: keep any document stating the full facility maximum out of the mortgage's express-incorporation clause, and have each per-draw instrument recite that it creates a new obligation rather than altering or extending the original. It also corrects a cap assumption the vault was carrying from the August brief: neither recording tax is capped on a recorded mortgage.
Open follow-ups
- Does any Florida court or DOR advisement construe "maximum indebtedness secured" in Rule 12B-4.052(8), F.A.C. (effective 1/25/2026) as the stated sec. 697.04 ceiling rather than the maximum present indebtedness exclusive of future-advance capacity? The harmonizing reading is the only one consistent with sec. 201.08(1)(b), but the sentence is nine months old and unconstrued, and it is the only text in the chain that could support the feared result. Checked: absent from the vault.
- How does Florida distinguish a "line of credit" from a non-revolving future-advance mortgage for purposes of Fla. Stat. sec. 199.143(3), given that neither Chapter 199 nor Rule 12C-2.001 defines the term and the intangible-tax rule chapter contains no line-of-credit or future-advance rule at all? The documentary-stamp rule supplies "revolving" as the hinge, but by analogy only, and Barnett Bank has now been read in primary text and does not answer it, since it never mentions future advances. The remaining primary route is the post-1997 intangible-tax advisement corpus. Checked: absent from the vault.
- Does the post-1997 statutory definition of "renewal" in Fla. Stat. sec. 201.08(5) change the Leesburg result for a per-draw mortgage modification or spreader on a construction loan? Leesburg (1992) predates both sec. 201.08(5) and Rule 12B-4.052(10), and DOR's losing theory there was precisely that each draw instrument was a renewal of the whole balance. The current text appears to foreclose that theory, but nothing confirms that a court or DOR has applied it to a staged construction draw. This is the live audit exposure, so it is worth more than the taxable-base question at this point. Checked: absent from the vault.
- Was the conflict certified in Glenn Wright Homes (2009) between the 4th DCA and the 1st, 3d and 5th DCAs on whether unpaid documentary stamp tax bars enforcement ever accepted or resolved by the Florida Supreme Court? Searched without result, so this is "not located," not "confirmed nonexistent." It governs how severe a missed per-draw payment is in a Hillsborough County action, which sits in the 2d DCA, a district not on either side of the certified conflict. Checked: absent from the vault.
Next actions needing a credentialed human or a live account, not research: confirm the per-draw filing mechanics and who owns them with the closing agent or clerk's office; have the CPA or closing attorney compute the actual recording-time base from the draft instrument; and if the Rule 12B-4.052(8) ambiguity above is worth eliminating rather than managing, a DOR Technical Assistance Advisement request under sec. 213.22 is the instrument that produces a binding answer on the founder's own facts. None of these are research questions and none belong in the research queue.
Related
- [[2026-11-06-florida-future-advances-mortgage-characterization]]
- [[2026-08-25-florida-intra-family-purchase-money-note]]
- [[2026-11-02-florida-purchase-money-mortgage-simultaneity-window]]
- [[2026-10-28-florida-homestead-purchase-money-family-mortgage]]
- [[2026-08-14-construction-to-permanent-loans-florida]]
- [[2026-10-22-construction-loan-structure-rate-lock-carry]]
Sources
Vault
~/rdco-vault/06-reference/research/2026-11-06-florida-future-advances-mortgage-characterization.md~/rdco-vault/06-reference/research/2026-08-25-florida-intra-family-purchase-money-note.md~/rdco-vault/06-reference/research/2026-11-02-florida-purchase-money-mortgage-simultaneity-window.md~/rdco-vault/06-reference/research/2026-10-28-florida-homestead-purchase-money-family-mortgage.md
Statutes (2026 Florida Statutes, primary)
- Fla. Stat. sec. 201.08 — Tax on promissory or nonnegotiable notes, written obligations to pay money — https://www.flsenate.gov/Laws/Statutes/2026/201.08
- Fla. Stat. sec. 199.133 — Levy of nonrecurring tax — https://www.flsenate.gov/Laws/Statutes/2026/199.133
- Fla. Stat. sec. 199.135 — Due date and payment of nonrecurring tax — https://www.flsenate.gov/Laws/Statutes/2026/199.135
- Fla. Stat. sec. 199.143 — Future advances — https://www.flsenate.gov/Laws/Statutes/2026/199.143
- Fla. Stat. sec. 199.145 — Corrective mortgages; assignments; assumptions; refinancing — https://www.flsenate.gov/Laws/Statutes/2026/199.145
- Fla. Stat. sec. 199.155 — Valuation — https://www.flsenate.gov/Laws/Statutes/2026/199.155
- Fla. Stat. sec. 199.282 — Penalties for violation of this chapter — https://www.flsenate.gov/Laws/Statutes/2026/199.282
- Fla. Stat. ch. 199 part structure (Part I, ss. 199.133-199.183) — https://www.flsenate.gov/Laws/Statutes/2026/Chapter199
Florida Administrative Code (certified text via flrules.org, primary)
- Rule 12B-4.052, F.A.C., Computation of Tax; Definitions, effective 1/25/2026 — https://www.flrules.org/gateway/ruleNo.asp?id=12B-4.052
- Rule 12C-2.010, F.A.C., Valuations — https://www.flrules.org/gateway/ruleNo.asp?id=12C-2.010
- Rule 12C-2.011, F.A.C., Administration, effective 12/29/2025 — https://www.flrules.org/gateway/ruleNo.asp?id=12C-2.011
- Rule 12C-2.001, F.A.C., Definitions — https://www.flrules.org/gateway/ruleNo.asp?id=12C-2.001
- Chapter 12C-2, F.A.C., rule index — https://www.flrules.org/gateway/ChapterHome.asp?Chapter=12C-2
- DOR Chapter 12C-2 rulemaking package, 2025 (draft language, notice of proposed rule) — https://floridarevenue.com/rules/pdf/12C-2_draftlang_081425.pdf
Florida Department of Revenue Technical Assistance Advisements (primary documents; binding only on the requesting taxpayer under sec. 213.22)
- TAA 92(M)-009 (Oct. 20, 1992), Loans Under Mortgage Providing for Future Advances — https://floridarevenue.com/TaxLaw/Documents/TAA%2092M-009.pdf
- TAA 88(B)4-011 (Sep. 7, 1988), Mortgages; Future Advances — https://floridarevenue.com/TaxLaw/Documents/TAA%2088B4-011.pdf
- TAA 83(M)-008 (Oct. 27, 1983), Construction Loan — https://floridarevenue.com/TaxLaw/Documents/83M-008.pdf
- TAA 21B4-002 (Feb. 17, 2021), Revolving Credit Agreement — https://floridarevenue.com/TaxLaw/Documents/21B4-002.pdf
- TAA 11B4-008, Line of Credit Agreement — https://floridarevenue.com/TaxLaw/Documents/TAA%2011B4-008.pdf
- TAA 89(M)-006 — superseded by 89M-006R (Nov. 16, 1989); noted here only to record that it must not be cited — https://floridarevenue.com/TaxLaw/Documents/TAA%2089M-006.pdf
Cases (all read in primary opinion text except where noted)
- Dep't of Revenue v. Citizens National Bank of Leesburg, 618 So. 2d 252 (Fla. 5th DCA Dec. 18, 1992), 1992 WL 371554 — future advance taxed on the advance only; DOR's renewal recharacterization rejected
- Barnett Bank of South Florida, N.A. v. State of Florida, Dep't of Revenue, 571 So. 2d 527 (Fla. 3d DCA Dec. 11, 1990), No. 90-1551, aff'g consolidated DOR Declaratory Statement 90-004 DS — revolving line of credit taxed on the maximum; contingency no defense; face-of-the-document measure
- Steinberg v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 178 So. 3d 473 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015), No. 4D14-1200, 2015 WL 6161123 — sec. 697.04 is not a taxation statute. (Caution: CourtListener / Harvard CAP metadata mislabels this opinion 2016.)
- Nikooie v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 183 So. 3d 424 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014) — sec. 201.08(1)(b) enforcement bar is self-executing and non-waivable
- Glenn Wright Homes (Delray) LLC v. Lowy, 18 So. 3d 693 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (en banc) — certified conflict; bar does not reach unsecured unrecorded notes
- Schroeder v. MTGLQ Investors, L.P., No. 4D18-3177 (Fla. 4th DCA Sept. 18, 2019) — bar enforced on secured debt, raised sua sponte
- Dep't of Revenue v. Lincoln Pointe Assocs., 544 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989) — not opened; relied on as applied and quoted in Barnett Bank and Leesburg
- Indus. Supply Corp. v. Bricker, 306 So. 2d 133 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975) — face amount suffices as the sec. 697.04 stated maximum; carried forward from the parent brief
- DOR Declaratory Statement 90-004 DS bundled with the Third District opinion — https://floridarevenue.com/TaxLaw/Documents/BarnettBankofSouthFlorida%3BSoutheastBank%3BSunBankMiami-DCAOpiniononDeclaratoryStatement90-004%20MandateOpinionDS%20combined.pdf
Access gates encountered
- law.justia.com returns 403 (Cloudflare JS challenge); casetext returns HTTP 410, service retired. Neither retried.
- CourtListener's HTML pages and REST API are blocked to plain curl (401 on the API, empty 202 on opinion pages), but its
/c/<reporter>/<vol>/<page>/citation redirect resolves under curl and yields the opinion id, and its search works under Playwright. Case text was ultimately read via hallapproved.com, which republishes CourtListener / Harvard Caselaw Access Project bulk text at/fl/cases/appeals/<year>/<opinion_id>/. - flsenate.gov, flrules.org and floridarevenue.com all serve under plain curl with a browser User-Agent. No Cloudflare gate on any Florida state source in this chain. The Revenue Law Library at revenuelaw.floridarevenue.com redirects to a SharePoint search app whose REST query endpoint answers unauthenticated. Certified F.A.C. rule text is reachable at
flrules.org/gateway/readFile.asp?sid=0&tid=<notice_id>&type=1&file=<rule>.doc. - Unresolved and left unresolved deliberately: whether the 2-13-91 amendment to Rule 12B-4.052, which landed two months after Barnett Bank, is where DOR wrote that holding into the rule. Plausible but not checked, and nothing in the brief depends on it.