A CoCo connection profile delivers plugins but does not govern them. The governable seam is permissions in a root-owned managed-settings.json, CoCo's managed schema has forked from Claude Code's, and strictKnownMarketplaces is not in it.
The question
"How is a Cortex Code connection-profile plugin set defined and delivered (connections.toml key, managed-settings file, or account object), can an end user override it, and does CoCo honor Claude Code managed-settings keys such as strictKnownMarketplaces and plugin userConfig sensitive fields?"
This merges the first two open follow-ups from [[2026-09-14-brigade-snowflake-connection-profile-governed-rollout]]. It is a governance question, not a packaging one: if RDCO/phData ships a governed plugin set to a client's analysts through CoCo, the value collapses the moment an analyst can swap it out.
Label convention used throughout. Every claim below is tagged [CoCo-verified] (read today at a Snowflake docs page), [CC-only] (verified in the local Claude Code install, upstream behavior that is not established for CoCo), or [unresolved]. CoCo is a fork. Silence in Snowflake's docs is not confirmation that upstream behavior carries over, and this brief found two-way divergence that proves the point.
What we already know (from the vault)
- The delivery claim was recorded but never pinned down. [[2026-09-14-brigade-snowflake-connection-profile-governed-rollout]] fetched the CoCo plugins page and found only "Administrators can ship plugins as part of a Snowflake connection profile so that every user of that profile gets a consistent baseline of skills, agents, hooks, and MCP servers," with profile-shipped plugins showing origin
profile. It flagged verbatim that "the page gives no config key, file location or SQL, so it is unclear whether the profile is a localconnections.tomlentry or an account-side object." - Override was an open hole, not a finding. The same brief recorded "no allowlist, no way to block user-added plugins, and no statement on whether a user can edit or remove the profile's plugins." That is what this brief resolves.
- The only admin control then known was one MCP toggle.
areUserMcpServersAllowed: falsein managed settings, which also skips plugin-declared MCP servers. No plugin allowlist was documented. - Runtime surface is already settled, so this brief does not revisit it. [[2026-09-13-cortex-code-client-deployable-surface-p3-p4]] settled that the client-deployable P3 surface today is the CoCo CLI on SPCS using skills rather than a plugin, and that Plugins/MCP carried a Preview label on the overview page. Deployable surface is out of scope here.
- The credential path for MCP was already verified and is not re-opened. The Sept 14 brief verified OS-keychain storage,
${VAR}expansion in everymcp.jsonfield, migration of-e/-Hvalues out ofmcp.json, and graceful degradation with no secrets on disk in a keychain-less container. What it did not verify was plugin-manifestuserConfig, which is a different mechanism. See point 4.
What the web says
All four CoCo pages below were read on 2026-11-05. None carries a "last updated" stamp, a Preview label, or a GA label; the only date text is a 2026 copyright footer. Two of them (/settings and /managed-settings) were search-level or unseen in the parent briefs, and /managed-settings is where the governance answer actually lives.
- [CoCo-verified] Plugin discovery is a seven-source chain, deduped by name, first-source-wins — and the connection profile ranks second, below a CLI flag. The order on CoCo CLI plugins is: (1)
--plugin-dirarguments at launch; (2) "Plugins declared by your active Snowflake connection profile"; (3) directories in thepluginsarray of~/.snowflake/cortex/settings.json; (4)~/.snowflake/cortex/plugins/tracked inregistry.json; (5).cortex/plugins/and.claude/plugins/in the working directory; (6) plugins bundled with the CoCo binary; (7) plugins synced from the CoCo skills repository, inactive by default. The page states the dedupe rule as "the first source that provides a plugin wins." - [CoCo-verified] The profile plugin-set declaration syntax is still undocumented, eight weeks after the parent brief. The administrator section of the plugins page is still two sentences long. No config key, no TOML, no JSON, no SQL, no file path. Re-reading it today confirms the Sept 14 gap has not been filled.
- [CoCo-verified] But managed settings give an administrator a way to own the connections file itself. The CoCo managed settings page documents a
filesblock withfiles.connectionsFile(example/etc/cortex/connections.toml) andfiles.mcpFile(example/etc/cortex/mcp.json). The managed file lives at/Library/Application Support/Cortex/managed-settings.json(macOS),/etc/cortex/managed-settings.json(Linux and WSL), or%ProgramData%\Cortex\managed-settings.json(Windows), in a directory that "requires administrator or root privileges to write to." - [CoCo-verified] CoCo's managed schema is sectioned, Snowflake-authored, and has no marketplace controls. Top-level keys:
version,enabled,permissions,settings,required,tenant,auth,cli,desktop,defaults,files,ui,sql.permissions"Controls which tools, skills, MCP servers, and Snowflake accounts the CLI may use," and plugin control appears only as permission patterns —plugin(*)is "All plugins,"plugin(bundled:*)is "Built-in plugins only," and there is askill(profile:*)pattern. Absent from the page:strictKnownMarketplaces,blockedMarketplaces,extraKnownMarketplaces,allowedMcpServers,areUserMcpServersAllowed,userConfig,sensitive,marketplace,allowedPlugins,disableAllHooks. - [CoCo-verified] CoCo splits managed settings into a hard half and a soft half, and the connection profile is in neither. The settings precedence chain, highest to lowest, is: (1) "Managed settings restrictions (
settings.*fields inmanaged-settings.json)"; (2) "Profile overrides (settingsOverridesfrom the active profile, if any)"; (3) project.cortex/settings.jsonor.claude/settings.json; (4) "Managed settings defaults (defaults.*fields inmanaged-settings.json)"; (5) global~/.snowflake/cortex/settings.json; (6) CLI built-in defaults.settings.*"Can't be overridden by any user-level configuration."defaults.*are explicitly soft: "Users can override these in their ownsettings.json," and fordefaults.profileNamethe managed-settings page says "Users can override this with-cor by changing their own settings." The page also notes position 2 refers to settings profiles viasettingsOverrides, not connection profiles. - [CoCo-verified] Hooks are governed in the opposite direction from plugins. Hook source priority on the plugins page is "global, then user, then project, then local project, then plugin, then connection profile (highest)." So a connection profile wins outright for hooks while losing to
--plugin-dirfor plugins. - [CC-only] Upstream Claude Code has exactly the marketplace-governance keys CoCo lacks, and they are managed-settings-only. Verified against the local install (
claude 2.1.318, binary dated 2026-11-03) by string-extracting the settings schema:strictKnownMarketplaces,allowedMarketplaces("Alias for strictKnownMarketplaces (managed settings only)"),blockedMarketplaces,extraKnownMarketplaces,strictPluginOnlyCustomization, anddisableSideloadFlagsall exist, with repeated schema text "Only honored from managed settings (server-managed, MDM / OS policy, ormanaged-settings.json); ignored in user, project, local and--settingssources."strictPluginOnlyCustomizationreads: "When set in managed settings, blocks non-plugin customization sources for the listed surfaces. Array form locks specific surfaces (e.g. ["skills", "hooks"]);truelocks all four... Blocked:~/.claude/{surface}/,.claude/{surface}/(project), settings.json hooks,.mcp.json."disableSideloadFlagsreads: "When true (and set in managed settings), rejects the--plugin-dir,--plugin-url,--agents, and non-sdk--mcp-configCLI flags at startup. Closes the CLI-flag bypass ofstrictKnownMarketplaces." - [CC-only] Upstream plugin
userConfigsensitive handling, including the plaintext fallback. The binary's schema describes storage of "sensitive option values from plugin manifestuserConfig, keyed by option name. Sensitive values go to secure storage instead." Secure storage is the macOS Keychain, written viasecurity -i, with observable failure paths "macOS Keychain is not writable" and a literal "Warning: Storing credentials in plaintext." alongside~/.claude/.credentials.json. This matches the trap the Sept 14 brief flagged.
Convergences and contradictions
- Convergence, sharpened. The parent brief's verdict that a connection profile is "a good distribution channel but not a governance control" is now confirmed by mechanism rather than by absence of evidence. Profile delivery sits at discovery rank 2 under a first-wins rule with a user-controllable flag above it, and the connection profile does not appear in the settings precedence chain at all. The parent inferred weakness from silence; this brief found the ranking that causes it.
- Contradiction found: the two schemas have forked in both directions, which breaks the "CoCo is Claude Code, so the enterprise keys carry over" assumption.
strictKnownMarketplacesexists upstream and is absent from CoCo's managed schema [CoCo-verified absent / CC-only present]. Conversely,areUserMcpServersAllowed— the one admin control the Sept 14 brief found in CoCo's docs — does not appear anywhere in the Claude Code 2.1.318 binary (zero matches); upstream's nearest equivalents areallowManagedMcpServersOnlyplusallowedMcpServers/deniedMcpServers. Neither schema is a superset of the other. - Internal doc inconsistency in CoCo, worth knowing before an admin conversation. The plugins page says
areUserMcpServersAllowedis set "in managed settings" and links to the managed-settings page "for the full enforcement schema," but that page's schema listing does not surface the key at any level this read reached. It is presumably nested undersettings.*orpermissions, but the enforcement schema as published does not show it. Do not quote a key path to a client admin that the schema page does not show. - Contradiction with the Sept 13 Preview record. Neither the plugins, settings, nor managed-settings page carries a Preview label today, while [[2026-09-13-cortex-code-client-deployable-surface-p3-p4]] recorded Plugins as Preview on the overview page. The label conflict the Sept 14 brief flagged is unresolved and has now persisted two months. Keep treating plugins as Preview until a dated release note says GA.
The five resolution points
- Delivery mechanism — partially resolved, and it is not an account object. [CoCo-verified] The plugin set is declared by the active Snowflake connection profile, it is discovery source 2 of 7, and profile-shipped plugins surface with origin
profileincortex plugin list. [CoCo-verified] Connections themselves live in~/.snowflake/connections.tomlor the shared~/.snowflake/config.toml, and an administrator can pin a root-owned connections file via managedfiles.connectionsFile(documented example/etc/cortex/connections.toml). [CoCo-verified] Nothing in CoCo's docs describes a Snowflake account-level object for plugin sets, so the "account object" branch of the question is answered no. [unresolved] The exact key that declares the plugin list inside a profile. All three relevant pages are silent; the docs do not state this, and it would need a test against a real CoCo deployment. The practically important half is resolved regardless: whichever key it is,files.connectionsFilemakes the file itself administrator-owned and root-writable-only. - User override — resolved, and the answer is yes, three ways. [CoCo-verified] (a)
--plugin-dirranks above the connection profile under first-wins dedupe-by-name, socortex --plugin-dir <dir>carrying a same-named plugin shadows the administrator's. (b)defaults.profileNameis in the soft half of managed settings: "Users can override this with-cor by changing their own settings," so a user can leave the governed profile entirely. (c) The working-directory sources.cortex/plugins/and.claude/plugins/are a further injection path from any repo an analyst clones. [unresolved] Whethercortex plugin disable/uninstallact on a profile-origin plugin; the page documents those commands only for "managed" plugins. The docs do not state this; it needs a test against a real CoCo deployment. [CoCo-verified] The genuine control that is non-overridable ispermissionsundersettings.*withplugin(*)/plugin(bundled:*)/skill(profile:*)patterns. Governance in CoCo is an allowlist on what may run, not a pin on what gets discovered. strictKnownMarketplaces— resolved: no. [CoCo-verified] The string does not appear on CoCo's plugins, settings, or managed-settings pages, and CoCo's published enforcement schema is a different, sectioned shape with no marketplace-allowlist concept at all. [CC-only] The key is real upstream, is managed-settings-only, has an aliasallowedMarketplaces, has a counterpartblockedMarketplaces, and has a companiondisableSideloadFlagswhose entire purpose is to close the--plugin-dirbypass. That companion is exactly what CoCo appears to be missing, which is why point 2(a) is open. Treat all six upstream keys as unavailable in CoCo until Snowflake documents otherwise.- Plugin
userConfigsensitive fields — unresolved for CoCo. [CoCo-verified] NeitheruserConfignorsensitiveappears on any CoCo page read today. [CC-only] Upstream routesuserConfigoptions marked sensitive to the macOS Keychain and falls back to plaintext~/.claude/.credentials.jsonwith an explicit plaintext warning when the Keychain is unwritable or the platform is not macOS. The Sept 14 brief verified CoCo's MCP credential path (keychain,${VAR}expansion, graceful no-disk degradation headless), butuserConfigis a plugin-manifest feature on a different code path and cannot be inferred from it. The docs do not state this; it would need a test against a real CoCo deployment. Until then, do not ship auserConfigsensitive: truefield in a client-bound plugin. - CoCo-specific divergences an administrator would be surprised by — resolved, six of them. [CoCo-verified] (a) The managed file path is
Cortex, notClaudeCode: an MDM profile written against/Library/Application Support/ClaudeCode/managed-settings.jsonor/etc/claude-code/managed-settings.jsonlands nowhere for CoCo. (b) The schema is sectioned (permissions/settings/defaults/files/...), not Claude Code's flat key set, so key-level reuse fails even where intent matches. (c) Managed settings are split into non-overridablesettings.*and user-overridabledefaults.*— an admin who puts a control indefaultshas shipped a suggestion, not a policy, and nothing in the key name warns them. (d) Connection profile is highest priority for hooks and second for plugins, an inversion that makes "profile-delivered" mean two different strengths depending on surface. (e) CoCo reads.claude/plugins/and.claude/settings.jsonfrom the working directory, so Claude-Code-named artifacts in a client repo are live inputs to CoCo. (f) "Profile" is overloaded: connection profile (plugins, hooks, originprofile) versus settings profile (settingsOverrides, precedence position 2). These are not the same object and the docs do not cross-reference them.
Synthesis for RDCO
The governed-rollout pitch has to change shape, and the change is specific rather than cosmetic. "Ship the governed plugin set via a Snowflake connection profile" reads like a Snowflake-side control and is not one. Profile delivery is discovery rank 2 of 7 under first-wins dedupe, sitting directly beneath a CLI flag that any analyst can pass, with no documented equivalent of upstream's disableSideloadFlags to close that bypass. An analyst who prefers their own version of a Brigade skill gets it by naming a directory and adding one flag. If we sell "consistent baseline" on the strength of the profile alone, the first curious analyst falsifies the claim, and they falsify it inside the client's own environment rather than in ours.
What replaces it is narrower but real, and it relocates the sale. The enforceable seam is permissions under settings.* in a root-owned managed-settings.json at /etc/cortex/managed-settings.json or the macOS and Windows equivalents, optionally paired with files.connectionsFile so the connections file itself is administrator-owned. That is an allowlist on what may run, expressed in plugin(...) and skill(profile:*) patterns, plus a pinned connections file. Two consequences follow. First, the deliverable is an endpoint-management artifact, not a Snowflake artifact: it ships through the client's MDM and needs root on analyst machines, so the counterparty is desktop/IT, not ACCOUNTADMIN. Every prior estimate that treated this as a Snowflake-account task is scoped against the wrong buyer and the wrong approval chain. Second, the split between settings.* and defaults.* has to be a named line item in any configuration we hand over, because putting a control in the wrong half silently downgrades it to a default a user can edit. That is a lint check we can write and a differentiator we can demonstrate.
The forked-schema finding is the piece with the longest reach, and it generalizes past this question. CoCo carries a marketplace-governance gap relative to upstream while also carrying at least one control upstream does not have, so neither schema is a superset of the other. Any sentence of the form "CoCo is Claude Code underneath, so the enterprise policy keys carry over" is now disproven by example in both directions. Practically: no Claude Code enterprise-policy recommendation reaches a client through us without being re-derived against CoCo's own schema page, and strictKnownMarketplaces, blockedMarketplaces, extraKnownMarketplaces, strictPluginOnlyCustomization and disableSideloadFlags are all off the table for CoCo deployments today. The same caution applies to the credential path: the MCP side is verified for CoCo, the plugin-manifest userConfig side is not, and the upstream fallback to plaintext ~/.claude/.credentials.json is exactly the failure mode our own no-secrets-on-disk rule exists to prevent ([[mcp-server-setup]]).
Finally, this strengthens rather than complicates the P3 recommendation already on the books. [[2026-09-13-cortex-code-client-deployable-surface-p3-p4]] landed on the CoCo CLI inside an SPCS container using skills. That path makes the entire override problem moot, because the analyst never holds the CLI process and therefore never holds --plugin-dir, -c, or a working directory we did not build. The override hole is an argument for the container, not against it. Where a client insists on analyst laptops, we should quote the MDM-delivered managed-settings.json as the governance control and say plainly that profile delivery is convenience, not enforcement.
Why this is in the vault
It closes the governance-control cell for deployment profile P3 in [[2026-07-07-hex-deployment-matrix-v2]] with a mechanism rather than an absence, and it retires the "connection profile = governed distribution" wording from [[2026-07-05-brigade-skills-snowflake-cortex-code]] before that phrasing reaches a client admin or a phData/Snowflake partner conversation. It also reassigns the counterparty for the governance deliverable from ACCOUNTADMIN to client endpoint management, which changes who has to approve a P3 rollout.
Live-deployment test plan
These are not research questions. Each is undocumented and resolvable only against a real CoCo install, so they belong here rather than in the follow-up queue.
- Find the profile plugin key. On a machine with CoCo CLI, add a trivial plugin to a connection profile by trial across candidate keys in
~/.snowflake/connections.toml(plugins,plugin_dirs,cortex_plugins), then runcortex plugin listand look for originprofile. Record the key that works. - Confirm the
--plugin-dirshadow. With a profile-delivered plugin namedXactive, launchcortex --plugin-dir <dir-containing-a-different-X>and check which onecortex plugin listreports and which one actually loads. This is the single most load-bearing unverified claim in the brief. - Test user removal of a profile plugin. Run
cortex plugin disable <X>andcortex plugin uninstall <X>against a profile-origin plugin and record whether either succeeds. - Test whether any upstream marketplace key is silently honored. Place
strictKnownMarketplacesanddisableSideloadFlagsinto/etc/cortex/managed-settings.json, restart, and check both for enforcement and for a schema-rejection warning. An undocumented-but-honored key would be a materially better answer than the current no. - Test
userConfigsensitive handling. Ship a plugin whose manifest declares auserConfigoption withsensitive: true, install it in CoCo, and record whether CoCo prompts for it, where it stores the value, and whether any plaintext file appears. Run once on macOS and once in a keychain-less Linux container. - Verify the
settings.*versusdefaults.*split empirically. Place the same control in each half, then attempt a user override from~/.snowflake/cortex/settings.jsonand from a-cflag. This is the lint rule we would sell; it should be measured, not quoted.
Open follow-ups
- Has Snowflake published a CoCo
managed-settings.jsonschema reference, example policy file, or quickstart anywhere outside the/managed-settingspage (release notes, Snowflake Labs GitHub, a Summit-era deployment guide) that names the connection-profile plugin key and the fullpermissionspattern grammar? - Does Plugins in Cortex Code Desktop document an organization-plugins directory or marketplace allowlist that the CLI page lacks? It surfaced in search today but was not fetched, and the Desktop surface is GA where the CLI plugin surface may still be Preview.
- What does CoCo's
permissionspattern grammar actually admit for plugins — is there aplugin(<name>@<marketplace>)form, a deny list, and a deny-by-default mode? The managed-settings page shows onlyplugin(*)andplugin(bundled:*), which is too coarse to express "exactly our plugin set and nothing else." - Is the Plugins Preview-versus-GA label conflict resolvable from a dated release note? It has now persisted across three briefs (Sept 13, Sept 14, Nov 5) and gates whether we can quote plugin delivery to a client at all.
Related
- [[2026-09-14-brigade-snowflake-connection-profile-governed-rollout]] — direct parent; origin of both merged follow-ups
- [[2026-09-13-cortex-code-client-deployable-surface-p3-p4]] — parent; deployable surface, Preview labels, the SPCS verdict this brief reinforces
- [[2026-07-05-brigade-skills-snowflake-cortex-code]] — grandparent; source of the "governed distribution" wording this brief retires
- [[2026-07-07-hex-deployment-matrix-v2]] — P3 governance cell this brief closes
- [[2026-07-03-hex-deployment-matrix]] — original P3/P4 profile definitions
- [[mcp-server-setup]] — RDCO no-secrets-on-disk SOP, the rule the upstream plaintext fallback violates
- [[2026-09-15-anthropic-skills-per-role-enablement-scoping]] — per-role plugin scoping verdict that the
permissionspattern finding bears on - [[2026-09-26-spcs-brigade-external-access-anthropic-reachability]] — the SPCS-side grants that accompany the container path
Sources
Vault
- [[2026-09-14-brigade-snowflake-connection-profile-governed-rollout]]
- [[2026-09-13-cortex-code-client-deployable-surface-p3-p4]]
- [[2026-07-05-brigade-skills-snowflake-cortex-code]]
- [[2026-07-07-hex-deployment-matrix-v2]]
- [[2026-07-03-hex-deployment-matrix]]
- [[mcp-server-setup]]
- [[2026-09-15-anthropic-skills-per-role-enablement-scoping]]
- [[2026-09-26-spcs-brigade-external-access-anthropic-reachability]]
Web, fetched 2026-11-05 (all three Snowflake pages undated, no Preview/GA label)
- CoCo CLI plugins — Snowflake docs — seven-source discovery order, first-wins dedupe, origin
profile, hook priority,areUserMcpServersAllowedcross-reference - CoCo managed settings — Snowflake docs — managed file paths per platform, sectioned schema,
permissionsplugin patterns,files.connectionsFile,defaults.profileNameoverridability. Not consulted by either parent brief; this is where the governance answer lives. - CoCo CLI settings — Snowflake docs — six-level settings precedence chain,
settings.*versusdefaults.*, config file inventory, connections in~/.snowflake/config.toml
Web, search-level 2026-11-05
- WebSearch (
docs.snowflake.com) surfaced CoCo CLI reference, Cortex Code in Claude Code, Cortex Code Agent SDK and Plugins in Cortex Code Desktop. None fetched; the Desktop plugins page is a named follow-up. - A second WebSearch for a
connections.tomlplugins key returned nothing on that topic, independently corroborating that the declaration syntax is unpublished.
Local install, primary evidence for all [CC-only] claims
- Claude Code
2.1.318, binary/Users/ray/.local/share/claude/versions/2.1.318dated 2026-11-03, inspected 2026-11-05 by string extraction of the embedded settings schema. Confirmed present:strictKnownMarketplaces,allowedMarketplaces(alias),blockedMarketplaces,extraKnownMarketplaces,strictPluginOnlyCustomization,disableSideloadFlags,allowManagedMcpServersOnly,allowedMcpServers,deniedMcpServers, plus theuserConfigsensitive-value storage description, the macOS Keychain write path, and the~/.claude/.credentials.jsonplaintext fallback with its "Warning: Storing credentials in plaintext." string. Confirmed absent:areUserMcpServersAllowed(zero matches), which is the CoCo-side half of the two-way schema divergence. - No managed-settings file exists on this machine (
/Library/Application Support/ClaudeCode/and/etc/claude-code/both absent), so upstream precedence claims rest on the schema text rather than on observed enforcement.
Research caps
QMD 2 of 5 queries. WebSearch 2 of 3. WebFetch 3 of 3 sources, all Snowflake docs, no paywalls encountered and no fetch failures. Parent briefs were read via a subagent extract rather than into this context, per the >5KB artifact rule.