06-reference/research

occupational exit rate distribution cut point

2026-10-09·research-brief·source: deep-research·by Ray Data Co (deep-research synthesis)
labor-displacementbls-employment-projectionsoccupational-separationsai-labor-marketcareer-strategy

The attrition buffer is 3.2%/yr for a median occupation and 1.4%/yr for software developers, and BLS projects no occupation crossing it

The question

Verbatim: "What is the empirical distribution of annual occupational exit rates (retirements + voluntary separations) across US occupations, and at what decline rate does measurable incumbent harm begin?"

A calibration follow-up to [[2026-07-28-technological-displacement-career-vs-generation]], which concluded that the predictor of within-career vs across-generation absorption is an occupation's annual decline rate measured against natural workforce attrition, then supplied only an ordering and explicitly flagged the missing benchmark: "the benchmark attrition rate is the number the whole hypothesis pivots on, and I did not fetch a source for it." This fetches it.

Short answer: the exit-rate distribution is now pinned precisely, with the caveat that BLS's rates are model projections for 2025-35 rather than observed exits. The cut point is a band, roughly 3-4%/yr for a median occupation, and it must be computed per-occupation because the spread is wide. A mechanical route and an econometric route both land in that band, though the econometric one's position depends on a harm anchor I chose. The firmest result is that zero of 831 US occupations are projected to cross the mechanical line over 2025-35.

What we already know (from the vault)

What the web says

All figures below are from BLS Employment Projections, Table 1.10 "Occupational separations and openings, projected 2025-35" (bls.gov/emp/tables/occupational-separations-and-openings.htm; page last modified 2026-08-27; employment in thousands). Rates are BLS's own 2025-35 annual averages. I pulled all 1,112 rows and analysed the 831 rows BLS flags as Line item (detailed occupations), discarding the 281 Summary aggregate rows to avoid double-counting.

Convergences and contradictions

Synthesis for RDCO

The cut point is now a usable number, and it is a band rather than a point: roughly 3-4%/yr for a median occupation, with the honest operating rule being to compare an occupation's annualized decline to its own labor-force-exit rate from Table 1.10 rather than to any single economy-wide constant. The spread is too wide for a constant to be safe. The labor-force-exit rate runs from 1.3%/yr to 13.2%/yr across occupations, a tenfold range, because BLS builds it from a regression on worker characteristics such as age and educational attainment applied to each occupation's current employment mix. Using the all-occupations 4.2% as a universal benchmark would overstate the buffer for a young, highly-educated occupation by a factor of three.

That matters directly, because the founder's own lane sits among the thinnest attrition buffers in the economy. Software developers (15-1252) have a labor-force-exit rate of 1.4%/yr, at the first percentile of the distribution; only 8 of 831 occupations are lower, and the minimum is 1.3%/yr. Computer systems analysts are 2.2%, data scientists 1.7%, computer programmers 1.9%. Compare clerical: switchboard operators 7.1%, customer service representatives 5.0%, word processors 5.0%, secretaries 5.0%. The clerical occupations everyone points at as AI's first casualties have buffers three to five times wider than software does. A sustained decline of 2%/yr would be comfortably absorbed by non-replacement in customer service and would force incumbent software developers out. This inverts the intuitive reading of occupational exposure: being in a young, credentialed, low-turnover occupation is a liability under the rate test, because there are almost no retirements to absorb the shrinkage. It is also a caution against reading Table 1.10's current numbers as reassurance, since software developers are projected at +0.98%/yr and data scientists at +3.02%/yr, so the buffer is not currently being tested.

The second structural finding resolves the parent brief's framing more cleanly than the parent did: the across-generation channel has no threshold at all, while only the within-career channel has one. BLS's openings arithmetic makes this exact. From the published all-occupations row, 16,870.0 thousand separations plus 591.8 thousand of annual growth equals 17,461.8 thousand openings, matching the published openings figure to the decimal, which confirms openings are separations plus employment change. So for a declining occupation, openings are separations minus the decline. Tellers at -1.41%/yr with a 9.9% total separations rate still post about 8.5%/yr in openings, meaning an incumbent who wants to stay can stay, while the entry rate is about 14% lower than it would be in a flat occupation. Entry-cohort harm therefore scales smoothly from the first fraction of a percent of decline, with no cut point to find, which is why the Stanford 13% drop for 22-25-year-olds in [[2026-05-18-every-start-career-when-ai-doing-entry-level-job]] shows up long before incumbents are forced to move. The precise statement is narrower than "incumbent harm has a threshold": forced incumbent movement has a threshold at the exit rate, whereas measurable incumbent earnings harm appears well below it, since Edin et al. detect 2-5% cumulative losses at a relative decline of roughly 0.8-1.6 log points per year. So the exit rate bounds displacement, not harm.

On the arithmetic trap the dispatch flagged, the answer is that labor-force exits are the right denominator and total separations are not, and the reason is endogeneity rather than definitional tidiness. BLS splits separations into labor-force exits (leaving the occupation and the labour force, "due to retirement or other reasons") and occupational transfers (moving to a different occupation, counted as a permanent separation even though the worker stays employed). The case for exits rests on real-world worker behaviour, not on how BLS builds the numbers: BLS's methodology page describes both the exit model and the transfer model the same way, as a regression on worker characteristics such as age and educational attainment applied to the occupation's current employment distribution, so inside Table 1.10 the projected transfer rate is no more mechanically tied to projected decline than the exit rate is. What separates them is that leaving the labour force is driven mainly by age and life stage, whereas moving to another occupation is exactly the behaviour a demand decline induces. Edin et al. measure that response directly: their 0.71-0.95 elasticity for no longer working in the 1985 occupation shows decline pushing people out of the occupation, though by any route, since the measure bundles transfers with exits from employment. Using the 9.7%/yr total separations rate as the natural-attrition benchmark would inflate the benchmark precisely in the occupations under stress and would build the displacement being tested for into the test's own denominator. Neither series is a JOLTS-style quit rate, and neither counts job changes within the same occupation, so they must not be mixed with JOLTS turnover figures.

Confidence, calibrated. High on the extraction of the exit-rate distribution: it is a complete census of the 831 line items and my employment-weighted means reproduce BLS's published aggregates to within 0.06 points. But note what the distribution is: these are BLS regression projections of exit rates for 2025-35, not observed exits, so the question's request for an empirical distribution is answered with modelled rates and that substitution should travel with the number. High on the negative result that no projected occupation crosses its own exit rate over 2025-35, since that is a complete enumeration of the table. Low-to-medium on the 3-4%/yr band, downgraded from medium because Route B turns out to carry no independent validation. Low on any claim that the band transfers to an AI shock, for the reason Edin et al. give themselves.

"Measurable incumbent harm" is not a BLS construct and I had to operationalize it, which is an assumption and not a finding. I used two definitions. Mechanically, that the decline exceeds the occupation's own labor-force-exit rate, which is a necessary condition for forced incumbent movement and says nothing about welfare. In welfare terms, that mean cumulative career earnings losses reach about 10%. That 10% anchor is mine and is not published. The tempting justification, that 10% is the floor of the mass-layoff literature, does not survive checking: the mass-layoff figures Edin et al. cite are 4-6% of annual earnings over the 5-10 years after displacement in Sweden and 7-14% in the US, which are not in cumulative-career units and therefore cannot pin a cumulative-career anchor. The honest justification is weaker, that 10% is a round number comfortably above their 2-5% mean. The band is correspondingly sensitive: a 5% anchor moves it to 1.4-2.2%/yr, a 15% anchor to 4.1-6.7%/yr. That sensitivity is the real width of the answer and is why this brief reports a band and a per-occupation rule rather than manufacturing a single threshold. Three further limits on the elasticity route: the authors state their elasticities are likely upper bounds, which on its own pushes the required rate above 4.46%/yr; the denominator is a relative rather than absolute growth gap, which pushes it the other way; and it is Swedish data for pre-2013 technology. The harm function may also be convex, so that the linear extrapolation understates harm at high decline rates, but that is my conjecture and is not in the source.

Why this is in the vault

This supplies the one number [[2026-07-28-technological-displacement-career-vs-generation]] flagged as missing, which converts that brief's rate-vs-attrition ordering into a computable test, and it changes the read on the phData cert-escalator bet ([[project_phdata_cert_escalator_path]]) in a specific direction: the parent justified that bet on administrative-position grounds, and this brief adds that the software and data occupations the bet sits inside are among the thinnest-buffered in the economy (1.4-2.2%/yr, spanning the 1st percentile to roughly the 25th), so the administrative channel is doing more of the work than previously credited and skill adjacency even less. It also hands the credibility-for-phData-sales positioning argument a defensible number to lead with, in place of the usual move of citing BLS projections, which this brief shows do not support an incumbent-displacement claim anywhere in the 2025-35 vintage.

Open follow-ups

Related

Sources