Supply Chain Security SOP

Context

Supply chain attacks on package registries (npm, PyPI) are increasing, particularly targeting AI/ML tooling. axios 1.14.1 and litellm 1.82.8 were both compromised within the same week (March 2026). This SOP defines how we manage package dependencies safely.

Package Managers (Standardized)

Rules

Never Do

• pip install anything — always use uv
• npm update -g or npm install -g without founder approval
• Delete and regenerate lockfiles (that's when compromised versions get pulled in)
• Install packages with floating version ranges in production
• Auto-update dependencies in the restart script (claude update and plugin update are managed by Anthropic and are fine)

Always Do

• Pin exact versions in lockfiles
• Check release date before upgrading — prefer packages with releases older than 7 days
• Review changelogs and release notes before updating
• Audit new dependencies before installing: check download counts, maintainer history, and security advisories
• Flag any new package installs to the founder before executing

Before Updating Any Package

1. Check the package's latest release date — if < 7 days old, wait
2. Check Socket.dev or GitHub Advisory Database for known issues
3. Review the changelog — does the update make sense? Unexpected new dependencies are a red flag
4. Update in isolation, test, then commit the lockfile

Homebrew

• Don't run brew upgrade blindly — it upgrades everything
• Use brew upgrade <specific-package> for targeted updates
• Consider brew pin <package> for critical tools we don't want auto-upgraded
• Homebrew formulae are code-reviewed by maintainers, lower risk than npm/PyPI, but not zero
• Cask apps (GUI applications) auto-update themselves — harder to control

Currently Pinned (recommended)

brew pin tmux
brew pin node

Monitoring

• Periodically check installed packages against known compromises
• Watch for unusual new transitive dependencies in lockfiles after updates
• Subscribe to security advisories for critical packages

Incident Response

If a compromised package is found on the machine:

1. Check exact installed version — is it the affected version?
2. Check for the malicious payload (e.g., specific files, suspicious dependencies)
3. If compromised: uninstall immediately, audit for artifacts in temp directories
4. Notify founder
5. Document in vault under 06-reference/security-incidents/