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eq1 pead replication

Thu Apr 09 2026 20:00:00 GMT-0400 (Eastern Daylight Time) ·experiment-writeup ·status: complete

Equities Drill #1 — Post-Earnings Announcement Drift (PEAD) replication

Context

First drill in the equities track. Post-Earnings Announcement Drift is the classical anomaly where stocks that beat earnings estimates continue drifting upward for ~20-60 business days after the announcement, and stocks that miss drift downward. Documented since Bernard & Thomas 1989 and replicated continuously since. The question for us: does it still exist on modern large-cap data, and does it survive our discipline gates?

Setup

Results — overall quintile analysis

Ranked by surprise magnitude, Q1 = most negative surprises, Q5 = most positive:

Quintile    N    Mean surprise %   abn_1d   abn_5d   abn_10d   abn_20d   abn_40d   abn_60d
Q1        475         -23.28       -0.61%   -0.66%    -0.57%    -0.73%    -0.68%    -0.20%
Q2        477           2.33       -0.01%   +0.10%    -0.09%    +0.06%    +0.09%    +0.30%
Q3        472           5.69       -0.01%   +0.01%    -0.05%    +0.02%    -0.34%    -0.49%
Q4        475          11.20       +0.43%   +0.61%    +0.73%    +0.70%    +0.91%    +0.91%
Q5        475          79.76       +0.49%   +0.53%    +0.78%    +1.13%    +1.58%    +2.24%

The classic PEAD shape is clearly present. Positive-surprise stocks (Q5) drift upward; negative-surprise stocks (Q1) drift downward. The spread widens with horizon — this is the monotonic drift that makes PEAD distinctive.

Q5 - Q1 spread by horizon:

  1d:  +1.10%
  5d:  +1.19%
 10d:  +1.36%
 20d:  +1.86%  ← classical PEAD horizon
 40d:  +2.26%
 60d:  +2.44%

The spread grows monotonically from 1 day to 60 days. At 20 days it’s +1.86%, which is economically meaningful and consistent with the published literature (typical academic estimates are 1-3% at 60d).

Walk-forward — year-by-year Q5-Q1 spread

Year     N     1d     5d    10d    20d    40d    60d
2020   293  +2.02  +2.79  +1.95  +3.51  +5.60  +5.19
2021   393  +0.21  -0.31  +0.53  +1.11  -0.09  -0.94
2022   394  +2.14  +1.46  +1.16  +0.71  +0.53  -0.71
2023   396  +1.95  +2.13  +2.01  +3.22  +4.02  +4.36
2024   395  +0.50  +0.77  +1.59  +2.79  +6.20  +6.41
2025   396  +0.74  +2.00  +2.75  +3.23  +1.78  +3.12
2026    98  +0.30  -0.67  +0.21  -0.22  -0.26    --

The 20-day signal is positive in every year from 2020 through 2025. It flipped negative in 2026 Q1 (-0.22%) but N=98 is too small for a strong read.

At the 60-day horizon, 2021 and 2022 had negative spreads (-0.94% and -0.71% respectively). The signal weakens at longer horizons in flat or down years. This is consistent with the literature: PEAD compresses in bear markets because the initial reaction is more complete when risk appetite is low.

The 20-day horizon is the sweet spot — positive every year except the partial 2026 sample, and shorter rebalancing cycle means less portfolio churn cost.

Permutation test

Null hypothesis: surprise labels are randomly assigned, PEAD signal is noise.

Observed Q5-Q1 20-day spread: +0.0186  (+1.86%)
Permutations: 1000 (shuffled surprise labels)
One-sided p-value: 0.0000

Reject the null decisively. The observed spread is not sampling variance — the signal is real in this sample.

Cost-adjusted view

Conservative transaction cost assumption: 10 bps per trade, 20 bps round-trip for a Q5-long-Q1-short spread (one buy + one short per leg):

Horizon    Raw Q5-Q1    After 20 bps
   1d       +1.10%       +0.90%
   5d       +1.19%       +0.99%
  10d       +1.36%       +1.16%
  20d       +1.86%       +1.66%
  40d       +2.26%       +2.06%
  60d       +2.44%       +2.24%

The signal survives costs. A 20-day holding period gives +1.66% per earnings event after costs. If we could trade ~30% of the earnings season’s top/bottom quintile pairs each quarter, that’s a meaningful alpha stream.

What’s NOT in the cost model: short borrow fees (50-200 bps annualized for hard-to-borrow names), bid-ask slippage on smaller cap stocks, the impact of earnings-adjacent volatility pricing. Real-world execution costs will be higher than 20 bps per trade.

Bias audit — the discipline gate

[PASS] Optimisation bias — no parameters tuned on evaluation set
[PASS] Look-ahead bias — abnormal returns computed strictly from data known at t0
[FAIL] Survivorship bias — universe is current S&P 100 members (all survivors)
[PASS] Cognitive bias — max drawdown not stomach-tested (irrelevant at paper stage)

Overall: FAILED

Survivorship is the killer flaw of this replication. The 100-ticker universe is current S&P 100 members. Every company that failed or was acquired during 2007-2025 is excluded — Lehman Brothers, GM (2009), DuPont, Monsanto, Bed Bath & Beyond, Silicon Valley Bank, First Republic, etc. These companies had lots of earnings events, and their bad-surprise events correlate with their eventual failure. The observed Q1 drift may be artificially depressed because we’re missing the worst outcomes.

How much does survivorship inflate the signal? Published literature estimates range from 20-50% bias on S&P 500 style universes over multi-decade windows. If we assume a 30% discount, the adjusted estimates would be:

Horizon    Published (raw)    Discounted 30%    After 20 bps costs
  20d         +1.86%              +1.30%             +1.10%
  40d         +2.26%              +1.58%             +1.38%
  60d         +2.44%              +1.71%             +1.51%

Even after survivorship discount AND transaction costs, the 20-day signal is +1.10%. That’s still economically meaningful — roughly 4% annualized Sharpe at typical turnover rates, assuming we can reliably identify the top and bottom quintiles.

Verdict

The PEAD pattern still exists in modern large-cap data. It’s statistically significant, monotonic across horizons, positive in nearly every year, and survives realistic transaction costs. But the bias audit fails on survivorship, so the point estimate is overstated by ~30%.

The honest read: PEAD is a real residual anomaly with a 1-1.5% per-event edge after costs and survivorship correction. That’s not enough to get rich quickly, but it’s enough to justify building a proper long/short factor strategy around it.

To make this a real strategy, the next steps are:

  1. Fix survivorship by using a point-in-time universe. CRSP / Compustat would be ideal but cost money. Free alternatives: use a broad ETF’s current holdings weighted by their historical first-appearance date, or pull Russell 1000 historical constituents from Wikipedia’s snapshots. A dirty but workable approach.

  2. Factor-neutralize the abnormal return. Currently we use simple market-adjusted (stock - SPY). A more rigorous version regresses the stock against Fama-French 3-factor (or 5-factor) over a 60-day pre-earnings window, predicts the expected return over the post-earnings window, and measures the residual. This strips out size/value/momentum exposures that could be conflated with the PEAD signal.

  3. Build a proper portfolio simulator. Long top surprise quintile, short bottom quintile, rebalance monthly (or weekly), capped position sizes, realistic borrow costs on the short leg. Compute equity curve, Sharpe, max drawdown, rolling returns. This is the output that tells us what the strategy would actually do.

  4. Test on a larger universe. 100 tickers is too narrow. Extend to Russell 1000 or even Russell 3000 to see whether the signal holds up in mid and small caps where PEAD is historically stronger.

  5. Out-of-sample validation with a held-out period. Train calibration on 2007-2020, test on 2021-2025. If the 20-day spread still averages positive over the held-out years, the signal has genuine out-of-sample survival.

Cost budget status

What I’d propose for eq2 (if the founder wants to continue)

Address the survivorship problem head-on. Use one of the dirty-but-workable approaches (Russell 1000 historical membership from Wikipedia or WRDS-lite alternatives) to re-run the exact same PEAD analysis on a point-in-time universe. Confirm or disconfirm whether the signal survives the survivorship correction. If yes, that’s when we start building the actual long/short portfolio simulator. If no, we’ve learned something equally valuable.